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NOTES

Doctrines Without Borders: Territorial
Jurisdiction
and
the
Force
of
International Law in the Wake of
Rasul v. Bush
ABSTRACT

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States responded with military action aimed at eradicating
terrorist networks around the world. The action in Afghanistan
resulted in several hundred captured enemy combatants being
sent to the U.S. naval base at GuantanamoBay, Cuba. Because
the base is not within the territory of the United States, the
Bush administrationtook the position that the detainees could
be held indefinitely without review in civilian courts. In a
surprising move, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
detainees did have a right to petition civilian courts for habeas
corpus review. Thus, the habeas statute was given
extraterritorialapplication by the Court. That decision opened
the federal judiciary to these terror suspects and did so in a way
that lacks clarity and that could conceivably authorize habeas
review of any detention undertaken by the U.S. government
anywhere in the world. In November 2005, Congress took steps
to curtail the right of detainees at Guantanamo Bay to obtain
habeas review, but this move did not address all of the potential
sources for confusion, and in some respects the recent action of
Congress has added even more ambiguity to the law. Insofar as
this has the potential to greatly complicate the war on terror,
Congress must consider exercising its authority to amend the
habeas corpus statute further than it already has and thereby
address the questions that persist.
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Nam cetera malificia turn persequare, ubi
facta sunt; hoc, nisi provideris, ne accidat,
ubi evenit, frustra iudicia inplores: capta
urbe nihil fit reliqui victis.
Sallust, Bellum Catilinae 52:4-5

I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS "JUSTICE" IN THE WAR ON TERROR?
On September 20, 2001, shortly after the U.S. government
determined that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were responsible for
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a
joint session of Congress.' Articulating a new doctrine in foreign
policy, 2 he issued the following warning: "[A]ny nation that continues
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States
as a hostile regime. ' 3 The goal of this doctrine, which makes host
nations responsible for the actions of the terrorists they harbor, was
and remains the eradication of terrorist safe havens. 4 Indeed, both
the "Bush Doctrine" and the war on terror are intended to "starve
terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, [and] drive them
'5
from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest."
During his September 20th address, the President demanded of
the Taliban 6 that they "close immediately and permanently every

1.
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
print/20010920-8.html; see also A Nation Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B2
(discussing President's address and reporting that the United States had rejected a
peace deal offered by Afghanistan).
2.
See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Allies are Cautious on "Bush Doctrine," WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A01 (noting that the "use of the word 'doctrine' is
intentional... [and] meant to describe a new paradigm in U.S. foreign policy").
3.
Bush, supra note 1.
4.
See Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Federalist Society Annual
Convention Dinner (Nov. 15, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20011127.html ("As the Bush doctrine makes clear, those who
harbor terrorists share guilt for the acts they commit.").
5.
Bush, supra note 1.
6.
In the years before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had turned
its attention to the extreme nature of the Taliban regime and had even passed
resolutions in hopes of forcing that government to disassociate itself from terrorism
and bin Laden. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1333,
1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000)
(inter alia, reiterating previous Security Council resolution and demanding
Afghanistan's compliance including by such actions as ending support for terrorist
organizations, surrendering Osama bin Laden, and closing terrorist camps); S.C. Res.
1267,
1,4,6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (establishing special committee,
imposing sanctions and embargo, and otherwise criticizing Afghanistan and Taliban for
committing human rights violations, supporting terrorism, and harboring Osama bin
Laden). The actions taken by the United Nations, however, were obviously far from
effective.
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terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist,
and every person in their support structure, to appropriate
authorities. '7 Similarly, the U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, a
defender of the Bush Doctrine, 8 described the objectives of the
coalition as follows: "to close down the al-Qaeda network, bring UBL
and his associates to justice, and because the Taliban regime have
chosen to side with al-Qaeda, to remove them."9 Both leaders,
however, were often vague in describing how they envisioned
administering "justice" against individual terrorists and the extent to
which any formal judicial processes would be employed.10 Once
announced, the Bush administration's plans for detaining,
interrogating, and punishing suspected terrorists met strong criticism
from some quarters. 1 This presaged the legal difficulties to come.
To support the President's efforts in the war on terror, the U.S.
Congress passed a broad authorization for the use of force against
"those nations, organizations, and persons [the President] determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or
harbored such organizations or persons.' '12 When the President's
demands were not met, the United States undertook military action
designed explicitly to treat the recalcitrant Taliban regime as one
with the terrorists it harbored. 13 As a consequence of this military
campaign, a large number of illegal enemy combatants came within
the custody of the U.S. military. 14 Originally, the United States

7.
Bush, supra note 1.
8.
E.g., James Harding, War on Terror Bush Visit: Close friends reunited in
struggle against terrorism, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 2003, at 3 (providing example
of Blair's commitment to combating terrorism around the world).
9.
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech to the Welsh Assembly (Oct. 30, 2001),
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1636.asp.
10.
This observation is in no way meant as a criticism of either President Bush
or Prime Minister Blair, especially given the circumstances under which their
comments were given. The point is simply that the administration of justice against
terrorists and their leaders is not easily described. Cf. VICTOR DAvIs HANSON, AN
AUTUMN OF WAR: WHAT AMERICA LEARNED FROM SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE WAR ON
TERRORISM, 132-37 (2002) (providing satiric depiction of hypothetical trial for al-Qaeda
members).
11.
See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (describing perceived legal
problems present in the President's plan for trying enemy combatants). But see John
M. Bickers, Military Commissions are ConstitutionallySound: A Response to Professors
Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 899 (2003) (defending the legality of the
President's plan for military commissions).
12.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (emphasis added).
13.
Bush, supra note 1; cf. generally Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Strike
Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns 'Taliban Will Pay a
Price,'N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al.
14.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
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transported roughly 600 of these suspected terrorists to the U.S.
15
Navy's facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Under the Bush administration's policy, an enemy combatant
received multiple evaluations by the military. 16 First, upon capturing
an individual suspected of being a terrorist, the commander in the
field would assess the suspect based upon available evidence. 17 If the
commander believed that the individual was "part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners, and engaged
in an armed conflict against the United States" the suspect was
detained for further review.' 8 If not released at this stage of the
process, the individual was then "sent to a centralized holding in the
area of operations" for review by a "military screening team."'19 A
general officer reviewed the work of the screening team, and the
Department of Defense would review this report if the general officer
recommended that the suspect be sent to Guantanamo. 20 Finally,
upon the detainee's arrival at the base, additional evaluations would
occur, including review by "the Secretary of Defense or his
'2 1
designee."
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were made formally
responsible for reviewing each detainee at Guantanamo to determine
whether the detainee should be held there. 22 Furthermore,
particularized annual reviews are conducted to evaluate the need for
continued detention of each detainee; factors considered include the
level of threat presented by the individual as well as potential
intelligence value. 23 These reviews are to be distinguished from
actual military commissions whose task is to try those non-citizens
selected for war crimes prosecution. 24 To the dismay of many, 25 the

15.

Id.

16.
Brief of Respondents at 5, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004
WL 425739.
17.

Id.

18.
Id. at 4.
19.
Id. at 5.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 6.
22.
See Guantanamo Detainee Processes, United States Department of
Defense, http://www.defenselink.rnil/news/Sep2005/d2OO50908process.pdf.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.; see also GTMO Detainee Processes (rev. Nov. 14, 2005), United States
Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060215detainee
processeschart.pdf; Processes for Guantanamo Detainees, United States Department of
Defense,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d2OO602l5detaineeprocesses.pdf;
cf. JTF-GTMO Information on Detainees (current as of Mar. 4, 2005), United States
Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005d2OO503O4info.pdf.
25.
Cf., e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Criminals, Combatants, or What? An
Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror, 98 A.J.I.L. 686,
688 (Oct. 2004) ("To many civil libertarians, this broad assertion of presidential powers
looked like an instance of throwing out the rule-of-law baby with the bathwater of
inconvenient limits on absolute governmental discretion.").
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Bush administration's plan did not provide for scrutiny by the
judiciary at any time prior to actual prosecutorial action before a
military commission. 26 The Administration instead took the position
that, since these fighters were not prisoners of war, the full
protections of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to their
detention and treatment. 27 Moreover, because the war on terror is not
a traditional conflict among states, it is not possible to look forward to
a formal cessation of hostilities. This therefore raised the possibility
of great
of perpetual detention, a possibility that has become a 2source
8
consternation to many in the field of international law.
Although the Administration had stated from the outset that a
detainee convicted by a military tribunal would be able to challenge
his conviction in a federal civilian court, the fact of detention alone
would not itself trigger the right to have judicial review-at least that
was the Administration's interpretation of the law. 29 Indeed,
attempts by detainees to seek the benefit of judicial review by an
Article III court were initially unsuccessful. 30 The federal
government's process met an unanticipated difficulty, however, when
Rasul v. Bush,31 an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus
under the federal habeas statute,3 2 reached the U.S. Supreme
Court.3 3 Ruling against the U.S. government's position, the Court

26.
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2001, at A27 (editorial authored by then-White House Counsel explaining and
defending administration's proposed use of military tribunals) ("The order preserves
judicial review in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in
the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of
the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court.").
27.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002); Sue Anne
Pressley, Preparingfor Role in War on Terror: Navy Base in Cuba to House Taliban, Al
Qaeda Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2002 at A12; cf. Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks
to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al:
Each of the roughly 540 prisoners at Guantanamo have gone before a threemember military board to have their status as enemy combatants reviewed. A
final review has been completed in 487 cases; of those, all but 22 were found to
have been properly classified, a status leaving them subject to possible war
crimes charges.
28.
Cf. George Lardner, Jr., Legal Scholars Criticize Wording of Bush Order;
Accused Can Be Detained Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at A10 (reporting
criticism of vagueness in standards applicable to military detentions including limits
on time prisoners are able to be held before any trial).
29.
See Gonzales, supra note 26.
30.
See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction detainees' challenge to their detention in Cuba), afl'd, 321 F.3d 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
31.
542 U.S. 466.
32.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (2003).
33.
See Rasul, 466 U.S. at 485 (reversing lower court's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction).
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held that the detainees did have a right under the federal habeas
corpus statute to petition U.S. civilian courts for review of their
detentions. 34 While a majority of the Court determined that "the
federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the
Executive's potentially indefinite detention" 35 of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Justice Scalia penned a vigorous dissent, which
characterized the Court's ruling as "an irresponsible overturning of
settled law in a matter of extreme importance to our forces currently
in the field. ' 36 One area that Justice Scalia found particularly
egregious was the fact that the Court's decision "extends to aliens
detained by the United States military, outside the sovereign borders
of the United States and beyond the territorialjurisdiction of all its
courts." 37 In sum, the dissent was especially troubled by what it
viewed as a new extraterritoriality in the jurisdictional power of U.S.
courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.38
Part II of this Note will review the major precedents that shaped
the legal framework before Rasul. It will focus primarily on the World
39
War II-era case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,
a case which the dissent
40
in Rasul argued should control.
Part III will shift to discuss the
Supreme Court's opinion in Rasul v. Bush, and Part IV will closely
examine Justice Scalia's dissent in order to understand how the law
has changed since Eisentrager;Part IV will also address the extent to
which the Court's holding does in fact extend U.S. habeas corpus
jurisdiction beyond previous bounds. Finally, Part V will discuss
subsequent legal developments that have followed Rasul (including a
recent amendment to the habeas statute), consider the practical
impact of the decision, and explore what type of statutory and policy
changes are both permissible and necessary in light of the Supreme
Court's current reading of § 2241. On a more general level, this Note
also recommends that the role of international law in the current war
on terror be both predictable and narrowly circumscribed to prevent
it from interfering with the executive's ability to wage that war.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Cf.Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting):

Eisentrager'sdirectly-on-point statutory holding makes it exceedingly difficult
for the Court to reach the result it desires today .. .the latter course would
require the Court to explain why our almost categorical rule of stare decisis in
statutory cases should be set aside in order to complicate the present war, and,
having set it aside, to explain why the habeas statute does not mean what it
plainly says.
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BACKGROUND CASES

Much of the reasoning in the Rasul opinions is influenced by a
line of cases that arose after World War II, and the scope of
disagreement between the majority and dissent can be fully
understood only through examination of this history. One may
discern in these cases a broadening of habeas corpus jurisdiction over
time, and the question then becomes whether that general
broadening in domestic cases ought to apply in the international
context as well. In Rasul, the majority answered this question in the
affirmative.
A. Ahrens v. Clark
In Ahrens v. Clark,4 1 the Supreme Court considered "whether
the presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court of
the person detained is a prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus."4 2 The case arose out of the petition of 120 Germans
"being held at Ellis Island, New York, for deportation to
Germany... under removal orders issued by the Attorney General
who ha[d] found . . . [each of them to be] .. .dangerous to the public
peace and safety of the United States[.] ' 4 3 Their petitions had been
filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia because they
alleged that their detentions were ordered by the U.S. Attorney
General. 44 The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and
the court of appeals agreed. 45 Reviewing the question of territoriality,
the Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts' decisions. 4 6 It held
that the phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" as used in the
habeas corpus statute does in fact "limit the district courts to
inquiries into causes of restraints of liberty of those confined or
'4 7
restrained within the territorial jurisdictions of those courts.
Responding to the argument that the district court had jurisdiction in
this case because it had jurisdiction over the jailer (in this case the
Attorney General) the Court declared that "[i]t is not sufficient in our
'48
view that the jailer or custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction.
Although the Court noted that there was little precedent on this

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 190.
Id.
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was consistent
issue, it expressed the view that this understanding
49
with the implications to be found in prior cases.
In its rationale, the Court approached the matter pragmatically
and focused its inquiry on the pertinent legislative history to
understand Congress's intent. First, the Court noted that "the
statutory scheme contemplates a procedure which may bring the
prisoner before the court. '50 Reasoning that the petitioners' reading
would potentially require transportation of a prisoner held "perhaps
thousands of miles from the U.S. District Court that issued the
writ,"51 the Court decided that the risk of escape and the other
burdens presented by this alternative weighed against finding that
Congress intended the writ to be available in a district other than the
district of imprisonment. 52 Furthermore, this reading accorded with
53
the view of the writ held at the time of the statute's drafting.
Indeed, the Senate had added the phrase "within their respective
jurisdictions" precisely to address concerns that the bill, as originally
drafted, would have allowed a judge in one jurisdiction to order
prisoners being held in another state to appear before him in his
court. 54 In Ahrens, though, the majority specifically left unanswered
"the question of what process, if any, a person confined in an area not
subject the jurisdiction of any district court might employ to assert
'55
federal rights.
The Ahrens Court also articulated two important concepts
related to habeas relief that are now subject to question as a result of
the opinion announced by the Supreme Court in Rasul. First, it
stated that there is an "accepted premise that apart from the specific
exceptions created by Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts
is territorial.'56 Furthermore it held that, if the Court is to have
jurisdiction to hear petitions from those like the Ahrens prisoners,
57
Congress-not the Court-would have to create it explicitly.

49.
Id. ('There are few cases on all fours with the present one, the precise
question not having frequently arisen in the lower federal courts. But the general view
is that their jurisdiction is so confined.").
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 191.
Id.
52.
53.
Id. at 191-92.
54.

Id.

Id. at 193 n.4 (refusing to address the issue notwithstanding the
55.
Government's willingness "to waive the point so that we may make a decision on the
merits").
56.
Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
57.
Id. at 192-93.
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B. Johnson v. Eisentrager
The open question from Ahrens concerning an individual
detained outside the jurisdiction of any district court was answered a
59
few years later. 58 This case, Johnson v. Eisentrager,
arose from a
suit filed by multiple German nationals who had been apprehended
in China while engaged in activity contrary to the United States' war
effort (viz., espionage). 60 The actions of the German nationals violated
the laws of war. 61 Having been tried and convicted by a military
commission, they were sentenced to imprisonment in Germany's
Landsberg Prison, a facility that was then under the direct control of
the U.S. Army. 62 When the prisoners attempted to petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of
63
Columbia, the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed because, as
was stated by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman in his opinion for the
court, "any person who is deprived of his liberty by officials of the
United States, acting under purported authority of that Government,
and who can show that his confinement is in violation of a prohibition
of the Constitution, has a right to the writ [of habeas corpus]." 64 The
court went on to hold that the "petition for a writ of habeas corpus
will lie in the District Court which has territorial jurisdiction over the
officials who have directive power over the immediate jailer. '6 5 The
statute, according to the court of appeals, had to be read in this way
lest the prisoners be left without access to the writ of habeas corpusa situation the court said would be unconstitutional. 66 The majority
in Rasul some decades later would describe this action by saying, "In
essence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the habeas statute, as
construed in Ahrens, had created an unconstitutional gap that had to
' 67
be filled by reference to 'fundamentals.'
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit
and affirmed the district court's ruling. 68 Writing for the majority,

58.
59.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 490-91.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950).

60.

Id. at 765.

61.

Id. at 766.

62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 767 ('Thereupon the petition was dismissed on authority of Ahrens v.

Clark, 335 U.S. 188 ....
").
64.
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
65.
Id. at 963.
66.
Id. at 967 ("[W]e conclude that whatever may be the lack of forum in other
cases, the Constitution specifically prohibits that result in respect to habeas corpus.
Congress cannot suspend that privilege, unless there be invasion or rebellion.").
67.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478.
68.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 776.
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Justice Robert Jackson sharply departed from the reasoning that had
been employed by Judge Prettyman below. As the Rasul majority
aptly characterized it, Justice Jackson's opinion "proceeded from the
premise that 'nothing in our statutes' conferred federal-court
jurisdiction, and accordingly evaluated the Court of Appeals's resort
to 'fundamentals' on its own terms. ' 69 The Eisentrager Court first
differentiated the limited rights of resident enemy aliens-persons to
whom the United States does owe legal protections 7 0-from those of
nonresident enemy aliens. The majority then concluded that "the
nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the
service of the enemy, does not have even this qualified access to our
courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor
could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy."' 71 To underscore
how different the case at bar was from prior cases in which habeas
had been granted, the opinion enumerated six elements present in
Eisentrager.72 These elements included the fact that each prisoner
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) had never been or resided in the United
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at
73
all times imprisoned outside the United States.

Interestingly, each of these-even the first-somehow involves or
turns on territoriality. As will be seen, these factors gain increased
74
importance in Rasul.
Obviously concerned about the dangers inherent in granting
enemy aliens access to U.S. courts, Justice Jackson further criticized
the court of appeals: "It could not predicate relief upon any
intraterritorial contact of these prisoners with our laws or
institutions. Instead, it gave our Constitution an extraterritorial
application to embrace our enemies in arms. '75 Indeed, the opinion
extensively rebuked the court below for holding that the Constitution
applies to "all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are

69.
70.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 768).
See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 777-78:

We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens,
whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the
country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here for these
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign[.]
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
Id.

74.
75.

See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76, 486-88.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 781.
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located and whatever their offenses[.]J 7 6 The majority emphasized
that this case was not concerned with the rights of U.S. citizens 77 and
also distinguished between the rights possessed by resident aliens
and those non-citizens who are not present in the United States. 78
Regarding the rights of resident aliens, the opinion considered the
importance of territoriality to jurisdiction and said, "[I]n extending
constitutional protections beyond citizenry, the Court has been at
pain to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial
'79
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary the power to act."
The absurdity of the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court
explained, was illustrated by the "paradox" that it would "invest[ I
enemy aliens in unlawful hostile action against us with immunity
from military trial," while still leaving U.S. soldiers subject to
punishment following military adjudications.8 0 Indeed, the lower
court's ruling would necessarily "extend coverage of our Constitution
to nonresident alien enemies [even though that coverage is] denied to
81
resident alien enemies.
Taking the lower court's opinion to its perceived logical
conclusion, Justice Jackson argued that if, as the court of appeals had
held, "the Fifth Amendment confers its rights upon all the world
except Americans engaged in defending it, the same must be true of
the companion civil-rights Amendments.18 2 To illustrate the
absurdity of extending the protections of the Constitution in this
manner, he wrote:
Such a construction would mean that during military occupation
irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and "werewolves"
could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to bear
arms as in the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trials as in the Fifth
83
and Sixth Amendments.

76.
77.

Id. at 783; see generally id. at 781-84.
Id. at 769; see id.:

If a person's claim to United States citizenship is denied by any official,
Congress has directed our courts to entertain his action to declare him to be a
citizen "regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad." 54
Stat. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903. This Court long ago extended habeas corpus to one
seeking admission to the country to assure fair hearing of his claims to
citizenship . . .and has secured citizenship against forfeiture by involuntary
formal acts.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 771.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
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This section, as well as other parts of the opinion, makes clear that
Justice Jackson worried about the practical problems presented by
any judicial proceeding-other than a military trial-held to assess
the rights of those who had been captured while engaged in actions
that violated the laws of war.8 4 This rationale illustrates why the
Constitution does not apply in foreign theaters of war or elsewhere
beyond the territory of the United States. The statute itself, however,
could have conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction, but as Justice
Jackson wrote, "[s]uch extraterritorial application of organic law
would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of
governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have
failed to excite contemporary comment. '8 5 He then noted the total
lack of legal or historical authority to support the notion that the
86
statute was drafted to apply extraterritorially.
Because the Court so thoroughly articulated why the
Constitution does not apply to foreign enemy combatants held
overseas, the reasoning in the opinion is readily apparent.8 7 That is to
say, there is no longer a reason to read the habeas corpus statute as
applying to foreign enemy detainees-as the court of appeals had
done 8 8-- once the Constitution is no longer held to require such a
reading.89
The Court's opinion proceeded further9" to consider the reasons
given by the court below for finding the existence of "some action by
some official of the United States in excess of his authority which

84.
Id. at 782-83 (discussing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution as applicable to the petitioners under the court of appeals' rationale) ("No
suggestion is advanced by the court below, or by prisoners, of any constitutional
method by which violations of the laws of war endangering the United States forces
could be reached or punished, if it were not by a Military Commission in the theatre
where the offense was committed.").
85.
Id. at 784.
86.
Id. at 784-85.
87.
See, e.g., id. at 778 ("A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that
the prisoner will be produced before the court."); see generally id. at 778-81 (discussing
some practical considerations in affording foreign enemy combatants access to regular
U.S. courts).
88.
Cf. Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 965 ("We think that if a person has a right to a
writ of habeas corpus, he cannot be deprived of the privilege by an omission in a federal
jurisdictional statute."); id. at 966 ("So, if the existing jurisdictional act be construed to
deny the writ to a person entitled to it as a substantive right, the act would be
unconstitutional. It should be construed, if possible, to avoid that result."). See
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 781 ("Right to the writ, it reasoned, is a subsidiary right that
follows from possession of substantive procedural constitutional rights. These
prisoners, it considered, are invested with a right of personal liberty by our
Constitution and therefore must have the right to the remedial writ.").
89.
Id. at 768 ("Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right a
right, nor does anything in our statutes.").
90.
The Eisentrager dissenters consider this part of the opinion to be "wholly
irrelevant and lend[ing] no support whatever to the Court's holding that the District
Court was without jurisdiction." Id. at 792 (Black, J., dissenting).
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confers a private right to have it judicially voided." 91 This had been
the foundation for granting the writ. 92 After specifically considering
the nature of those claims, however, the Supreme Court concluded,
"[w]e are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing
lack of jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and
condemn these prisoners or that they acted in excess of their lawful
powers." 9 3 Thus, the Court concluded that "in the present application
we find no basis for invoking federal judicial power in any district,
[and] we need not debate as to where, if the case were otherwise, the
'94
petition should be filed."
Notably, Justice Black authored a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Douglas and Burton concurred. 95 The dissent's support for
the court of appeals' opinion below is expressed unambiguously. 96 The
dissenters disagreed with the idea that the Constitution is limited in
its extraterritorial effect and declared that its "principles are such
that their mandate of equal justice under law should be applied as
well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only
over thirteen colonies. ' 97 While Justice Black qualified this by stating
that not "every constitutional provision of the Bill of Rights [must be
applied] in controlling temporarily occupied countries[,J" his opinion
still contended that this does "not mean that the Constitution is
'98
wholly inapplicable in foreign territory that we occupy and govern.
As such, he would have held that habeas was available in this case
''as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment ... written
into the Constitution."99 Moreover, he would also have held that
habeas may not "be constitutionally abridged by [the] Executive or by
Congress."'10 0 This line of analysis would seem to foreclose the type of
reasoning used by the majority, which based its understanding of
habeas on the text and tradition of the actual statute. 10 1
The dissent's extraterritorial understanding of the statute would
have meant that U.S. courts could "exercise [jurisdiction] whenever
any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land
we govern." 10 2 (Notably, however, none of the justices believed that

91.
Id. at 785 (majority opinion).
92.
Id. ("For this reason it thought the writ could be granted.").
93.
Id. at 790.
94.
Id. at 790-91.
95.
Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
96.
Id. at 791-92 ("I agree with the Court of Appeals and need add little to the
cogent reasons given for its decision.") (Black, J., dissenting).
97.
Id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting).
98.
Id. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting).
99.
Id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting).
100.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
101.
Cf. id. at 778-79 (majority opinion).
102.
Id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the writ should be issued for enemy prisoners during time of war. 10 3)
The dissent's view, of course, did not prevail, and post-Eisentrager
neither the Constitution nor the habeas corpus statute appeared to be
available to enemy combatants held by U.S. military forces.
C. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
Although the majority opinion in Rasul relies heavily on the case
of Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 10 4 the dissent
would not consider it to have any bearing on the disposition of the
writ when sought by enemy detainees. 10 5 In Braden, Justice Brennan
wrote the opinion and was joined by four other justices 10 6 in holding
that "the language of § 2241 (a) requires nothing more than that the
court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.' 10 7 The
case arose from litigation undertaken by a prisoner who was serving
a sentence in Alabama and who had previously been indicted in
Kentucky.108 While serving time in Alabama, he petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky on various grounds related to the Kentucky indictment, the
impact it was having on his confinement in Alabama, and his desire
to have a speedy trial on the charges in Kentucky.10 9 His attack,
therefore, was upon the "validity of the Kentucky indictment which
underl[ay] the detainer lodged against him by [Kentucky]
officials [." 110 The majority held that the petitioner-prisoner could be
granted a writ of habeas corpus in Kentucky, even though he was
physically present in Alabama and thus outside the jurisdiction of a
Kentucky court.1 ' The Court there held that
[sio long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court
can issue a writ "within its jurisdiction" requiring that the prisoner be
brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he

103.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 796 (Black, J., dissenting) ("It would be fantastic to
suggest that alien enemies could haul our military leaders into judicial tribunals to
account for their day to day activities on the battlefront ... [but once] a foreign enemy
surrenders, the situation changes markedly.").
104.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973); see
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 ("subsequent decisions of this Court have filled the statutory
gap that had occasioned Eisentrager's resort to 'fundamentals"') (citing Braden, 410
U.S. at 495).
105.
See id. at 495 ("Where, as here, present physical custody is at issue, Braden
is inapposite, and Eisentragerunquestionably controls.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106.
107.

Braden, 410 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 495.

108.

Id. at 485.

109.

Id. at 487-88.

110.
111.

Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 495.

176

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:161

be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is
112
confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.

The majority's holding brought a strong dissent from then-Justice
Rehnquist that began by characterizing the Court's action as an
overruling of Ahrens. 113 The actual effect of Braden, though, is
susceptible-or at least it was prior to Rasul-to being characterized
as more concerned with the convenience of venue rather than with
the absolutes of jurisdiction. 11 4 Furthermore, as Justice Scalia's
dissent in Rasul correctly observed, Braden does not even address
115
Eisentrageror the rights of nonresident aliens.
D. Rasul v. Bush: Action in the Lower Courts
In an effort to challenge their confinement at Guantanamo Bay
following capture by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, various plaintiffs
sued the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. 116 Although a variety of claims were made by Rasul et al.
(e.g., a claim under the Alien Tort Statute117), the district court held
that the "exclusive means for securing the relief Petitioners seek is
through a writ of habeas corpus." 118 In the companion Odah case, the
plaintiffs (twelve Kuwaiti nationals) did not seek release, but again
the court considered the action only as a petition for a writ of habeas
119
corpus.
The district court's opinion, which dismissed the actions based
12 0
upon a lack of jurisdiction, rested squarely upon Eisentrager.
The
court considered and rejected the notion that Eisentrager did not
apply because that case had involved prisoners who had been
"deemed to be 'enemies' by a competent tribunal.''1 1 This decision
largely rested upon a pair of Supreme Court cases which established,
at least for that court, "that there is no meaningful distinction
between the cases at bar and the Eisentrager decision on the mere

112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 502 ("Today the Court overrules Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948),
which construed the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the lineal predecessor of
28 U.S.C. § 2241.") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114.
Cf., e.g., id. at 499-500 ("In view of these developments since Ahrens v.
Clark, we can no longer view that decision as establishing an inflexible jurisdictional
rule, dictating the choice of an inconvenient forum even in a class of cases which could
not have been foreseen at the time of our decision.") (majority opinion).
115.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
117.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
118.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 62.

119.

Id. at 65.

120.
Id.; see also id. at 68 ("Accordingly the Court finds that Eisentrager is
applicable to the aliens in these cases, who are held at Guantanamo Bay, even in the
absence of a determination by a military commission that they are 'enemies."').
121.
Id. at 67.
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basis that the petitioners in Eisentragerhad been found by a military
commission to be 'enemy' aliens. ' 122 Then the court undertook an
extensive analysis to determine "whether Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is
part of the sovereign territory of the United States.' 123 Looking to
several cases in a variety of contexts, 12 4 the district court concluded
that the naval base is indeed outside the sovereign territory of the
United States. 125 Upon that basis, the court found a want of
126
jurisdiction and dismissed both cases with prejudice.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
district court's dismissal. 127 First, it endorsed the district court's
conclusion that the status of the Guantanamo detainees does not
128
differ from that of the prisoners seeking relief in Eisentrager. It
then likewise affirmed the district court's reliance upon that case:
[N]o court in this country has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief, under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the Guantanamo detainees, even if they have not
been adjudicated enemies of the United States. We cannot see why, or
how, the writ may be made available to aliens abroad when basic
constitutional protections are not. This much is at the heart of
Eisentrager. If the Constitution does not entitle the detainees to due
process, and it does not, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of our

122.
Id.; see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that the same
constitutional protections do not apply to aliens outside the U.S. as would apply within
the country's borders); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)
(citing to Eisentrager as evidence that the Fifth Amendment does not apply
extraterritorially).
123.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68; see id. at 68-72 (discussing cases defining the
scope of U.S. sovereignty).
124.
For cases discussed in the district court's opinion, see Cuban American Bar
Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that Guantanamo
Bay is not a U.S. territory); Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
Micronesia, a trust territory from the U.N., to be the equivalent of a U.S. territory and
that persons living there are entitled to certain constitutional protections); Bird v.
United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 343 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that under the Federal
Tort Claims Act the U.S. Medical Facility at Guantanamo Bay falls under the act's
"foreign country" exception because Cuba exercises de jure sovereignty according to the
1903 Lease Agreement). But see Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNairy, 969 F.2d
1326, 1332-33 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that, once migrants claiming asylum had been
evaluated by INS, the U.S. government could not deny them due process of law),
vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918, 918
(1993).
125.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
126.
Id. at 73.
127.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
128.
Id. at 1140:
Nonetheless the Guantanamo detainees have much in common with the
German prisoners in Eisentrager. They too are aliens, they too were captured
during military operations, they were in a foreign country when captured, they
are now abroad, they are in the custody of the American military, and they
have never had any presence in the United States. For the reasons that follow
we believe that under Eisentrager these factors preclude the detainees from
seeking habeas relief in the courts of the United States.
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courts to test the constitutionality or the legality of restraints on their
liberty. 129

Finally, the court reviewed the status of the base where the
detainees are being held. 130 The court concluded that "[t]he text of the
leases . . . shows that Cuba-not the United States-has sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay." 131 With this background, the Supreme Court
would review the case, all but eviscerate the part of Eisentragerthat
had been applied below, and thus reshape the entire legal framework
surrounding the issues implicated in the detention of aliens outside of
the United States.
III.

RASUL V. BUSH AT THE SUPREME COURT

A. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by four
other justices, the Court reversed the court of appeals' affirmation of
the district court. 132 In light of prior case law on this issue, the
Court's decision must be viewed as startling. It found habeas
jurisdiction for federal courts, but did not expressly overrule
Eisentrager.Instead, the Court relied upon Braden: "Because Braden
overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager's holding,
Eisentrager plainly does not preclude the exercise of § 2241
jurisdiction over petitioners' claims." 133 The Court thus held that
cases since Eisentrager have "filled the statutory gap that had
occasioned Eisentrager's resort to 'fundamentals,' [and therefore]
persons detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal
district court no longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of
their right to federal habeas review. '134 This readily explains why the
constitutional question presented by Eisentragerwas not addressed
in Rasul: the "statutory predicate" (i.e., the prisoner's presence in the
jurisdiction of the court) was no longer required in the wake of
Braden. What is seemingly left then is a case of statutory, not
135
constitutional, interpretation.

129.
Id. at 1141.
130.
Id. at 1142-44.
131.
Id. at 1143; see also id. ("[U]nder Eisentrager,control is surely not the test.
Our military forces may have control over the naval base at Guantanamo, but our
military forces also had control over the Landsberg prison in Germany.").
132.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 469.
133.
Id. at 479.
134.
Id. at 478.
135.
Cf. id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And the latter course would require
the Court to explain why our almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases
should be set aside in order to complicate the present war .... ").
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Having addressed that issue and having held that the statute
applied to the detainees, the Court proceeded to discuss the nature of
U.S. jurisdiction over the Guantanamo Bay naval facility. 136 This
part of the decision is arguably of greatest importance for the scope of
this Note; therefore the precise logic of Justice Stevens's opinion
merits close analysis. Although all three federal courts addressed
jurisdiction over the naval base, the Supreme Court's methods
differed markedly from those of the two lower courts that had
addressed this question. Whereas the district and appeals courts had
undertaken this examination to determine what rights are extended
to aliens there 13 7 (which was part of the district court's examination
of territorial sovereignty1 38 ), the Supreme Court discussed the status
of Guantanamo Bay merely to counter the Government's claim that
"we can discern a limit on § 2241 through application of the
'longstanding principle of American law' that congressional
legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless
'139
such intent is clearly manifested.
In a statement that is as laconic as it is bold, Justice Stevens
wrote, "Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality
might have in other contexts, it certainly has no application to the
operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained
'140
within 'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United States.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens here cited to Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo,141 a case which addressed whether Congress had intended to
apply the so-called "eight hour law"'14 2 to work performed in foreign
countries. While in Foley Brothers it was undisputed that Congress
possessed the power to apply the law beyond U.S. borders, the Court
determined there that it was not Congress's intent to exercise that
power in the statute. 143 Indeed, the case was a matter of statutory
interpretation; hence the Court looked for "any indication of a
congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of
legislative control."'144 Moreover, the Court in Foley Brothers
mentioned the considerations Congress would have had in
determining the scope of the legislation by noting that "Congress is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions. We find nothing in the

136.
Id. at 480-82 (majority opinion).
137.
See Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73; Al-Odah, 321 F.3d at 1134.
138.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69.
139.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991)).
140.
Id. It remains unclear what would follow from a finding that the base is
part of the U.S.'s "territorial jurisdiction."
141.
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
142.
40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (1949).
143.
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284-85.
144.
Id. at 285.
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Act itself, as amended, nor in the legislative history, which would
lead to the belief that Congress entertained any intention other than
the normal one in this case. '145 The Foley Brothers Court also
contrasted the statute before it with a prior case holding that the Fair
Labor Standards Act did apply extraterritorially precisely because
146
Congress had used the term "possessions" in drafting the law.
Because Foley Bros. v. Filardo did so explicitly affirm that "[tihe
canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid approach
whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained," 147 it
is striking that Justice Stevens would have used this case in support
of his opinion here. Justice Stevens's point, however, appears to have
been that Guantanamo Bay is in some sense under the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States, and to support this notion he cited
to the 1903 Lease Agreement between the United States and Cuba,
which had given the United States "complete jurisdiction and control"
over the property there. 48 The opinion itself does not provide any
further discussion of what constitutes "territorial jurisdiction."
Rather, it returned to reasoning that habeas jurisdiction lies because
(1) it would reach U.S. citizens held there149 and (2) the text of "the
statute draws no distinction between American and aliens held in
federal custody.' 150 Presumably Justice Stevens's comment that
"there is little reason to think that Congress intended the
geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the
detainee's citizenship"' 1 substitutes for the Court's investigation into
congressional intent that was conducted in Foley Brothers.
By this point in the majority's opinion, it seems inescapable that
two independent rationales are at work in the Court's reasoning. One
notion is that habeas jurisdiction exists in Rasul as a result of the
federal courts' having jurisdiction over the custodian (that being the
only jurisdiction necessary in the wake of Braden). The other notion
is that federal courts have jurisdiction over the facility at
Guantanamo Bay because of the base's status. If the second notion
were in fact forming part of an additional requirement for the
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction, the scope of the Court's
opinion would be much more limited. That is, it might apply to
prisoners held in a longstanding territory leased formally by the

145.
Id.
146.
Id.; see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389 (1948) (applying
the Fair Labor Standards Act so as to cover American contractors in Bermuda).
147.
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
148.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
149.
Id. (a point with which the Government had agreed).
150.
Id.
151.

Id.
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United States, but not to prisoners at an ad hoc facility on foreign
territory in or near a war zone. The Court, however, did not elevate
this to an explicit requirement. In fact, the majority's entire
discussion of "territorial jurisdiction" is apparently rendered
unnecessary by its conclusion that "Section 2241, by its terms,
requires nothing more" than "the District Court's jurisdiction over
petitioners' custodians.' 1 52 This is certainly how Justice Scalia viewed
the Court's holding. 153 The Court's conclusion then about the proper
construction of the habeas statute apparently obviates any
requirement of territorial jurisdiction over the petitioner. Moreover,
such a conclusion logically means that a federal court's jurisdiction
would reach any prisoner detained anywhere in the world by U.S.
armed forces or another government agency. 154 As a result, there
would also seem to be no requirement that the prisoner be located in
anything able to be described as "within the 'territorial jurisdiction' of
the United States."
It might very well be that the Court's discussion of "territorial
jurisdiction" is a signal that the Court will treat an ad hoc detention
on a battlefield differently than detention at Guantanamo Bay, but
nothing in the Court's opinion provides a firm foundation for this
conclusion. Even a more modest reading of the opinion's effect on
territorial jurisdiction is difficult to establish insofar as the Court
totally avoided making the prisoner's location a matter of concern for
a petitioned court. 155 (This point will be clarified later in this Note's
analysis.)
Justice Stevens's discussion of the common law history of the
writ's jurisdiction also gives rise to some confusion regarding the
territorial basis for habeas jurisdiction. The opinion states:
"Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is
156
consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus."
After writing this, Justice Stevens then discussed the history of the
writ at common law in Britain, asserting that in the eighteenth
century the "there was 'no doubt' as to the court's power to issue writs

152.
Id. at 483-84.
153.
Id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The habeas statute is (according to the
court) being applied domestically, to 'petitioners' custodians,' and the doctrine that
statutes are presumed to have no extraterritorial effect simply has no
application ...Fortunately, however, the Court's irrelevant discussion also happens to
be wrong.").
154.
Cf. id. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In abandoning the venerable
statutory line drawn in Eisentrager,the Court boldly extends the scope of the habeas
statute to the four corners of the earth.").
155.
This reasoning is more like that contained in the concurrence authored by
Justice Kennedy.

156.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481.
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of habeas corpus if the territory was 'under the subjection of the
15 7
Crown."'
The Court was, of course, not performing a direct inquiry into
congressional intent at the time the U.S. habeas corpus statute was
written. An analysis based upon legislative history would have cast
doubt upon the Court's argument here regarding the reach of the
statute to persons over whom the petitioned court does not have
jurisdiction, 158 and indeed, the Supreme Court had already engaged
in such an analysis in Ahrens.15 9 There it reviewed the statute's
enactment in 1842 and the changes made to the bill by Senator
Trumbull to placate those who worried that the bill as drafted "would
permit 'a district judge in Florida to bring before him some men
convicted and sentenced and held under imprisonment in the State of
Vermont or in any of the further states." 160 As a result of that
analysis, the Ahrens Court concluded explicitly that "the language of
the statute" and "legislative history" along with "considerations of
policy" all support denial of the writ when it is sought by a petitioner
16 1
outside the jurisdiction of any court.
As such, Justice Stevens's historical discussion is a discussion of
the writ's common law tradition and features, 162 which it could be
argued (albeit with difficulty, given how the Ahrens court
characterized the legislative history) Congress did not intend to
curtail with the passage of the statute. 6 3 Moreover, Justice Stevens's
argument avoided mentioning the fact that the jurisdiction of federal
courts does not necessarily extend to grant review of every action
taken by the president; this is the case a fortiori when the
presidential action in question is within the sphere of foreign
1
relations. 64

157.
Id. at 482 (citing Lord Mansfield in King v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 59899 (K.B. 1759)).
158.
See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 191-93.
159.
Id.
160.
Id. at 192 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867)).
161.
Id.
162.
It should be acknowledged that Justice Stevens did at the beginning of his
opinion undertake a brief historical survey of the functioning of the writ in U.S. courts,
but it is not clear what significance that has upon the holding in the case sub judice.
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473-75. The gist of his discussion there appears to be that the
writ is meant, at least in part, to challenge detentions undertaken by the executive
without a trial, and that judicial review of habeas petitions has occurred "in a wide
variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace."
Id.
163.
ContraAhrens, 335 U.S. at 191 ("Prior to that date [Aug. 1842] it was the
accepted view that a prisoner must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the District
Court in order to obtain from it a writ of habeas corpus.").
164.
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936):
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Nevertheless, the majority concluded its discussion of the
traditional power of British habeas jurisdiction by stating that "the
reach of the writ depended not on formal notions of territorial
sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of 'the exact extent
and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact by the
Crown.' 165 Again, the significance of this statement is problematic.
The Court's treatment of the "exact extent and nature of the
jurisdiction or dominion exercised" by the United States over the
naval base in Cuba is cursory at best. 166 Instead, the majority made
clear elsewhere in the opinion that the dispositive question for the
petitioned court post-Rasul is whether the court has jurisdiction over
the "custodians," a term which is notably not limited simply to the
administrator of the prison facility. 167 That being the case, the right
under the statute to petition for a writ of habeas corpus would
apparently extend to a prisoner held by the United States regardless
of the nature of the jurisdiction possessed over the territory wherein
he is held. Therefore, it seems necessary to conclude that the Court in
Rasul allowed, just as Justice Scalia's dissent claimed, 168 extensive
(even worldwide) extraterritorial application of the statutory writ of
habeas corpus.
The Court, however, did not stop at apparently allowing
extraterritorial jurisdiction for habeas corpus claims. Reversing the
court of appeals, which had affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the petitioners' actions under the federal question 169 and Alien Tort
Claims statutes, 7 0 the Supreme Court held that the petitioners could
also pursue claims under these statutory authorities. 17 1 The critical
distinction is the view that each of the various courts took of
Eisentrager and its force regarding the habeas statute. The lower
courts had viewed the other statutory actions as essentially habeas

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success
for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective
through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The principle that the
courts shall be prudent in the exercise of their authority is never more compelling than
when they are called upon to adjudicate on such sensitive issues as those trenching
upon military and foreign affairs.").
165.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482 (citing Ex parte Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 303
(C.A.) (U.K.)).
166.
Id. at 482; cf. id. at 471-72 (describing the U.S.-Cuba lease agreements).
167.

Id. at 483.

168.
169.

Id. at 497-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 1331.

170.
171.

Id. § 1350.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
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actions under alternative guises, and therefore they had to be
dismissed under Eisentrager.172 In contrast, the Supreme Court held
that "Eisentrageritself erects no bar to the exercise of federal court
jurisdiction over the petitioners' habeas corpus claims. It therefore
certainly does not bar the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction over
claims that merely implicated the 'same category of laws listed in the
habeas corpus statute."' 1 73 These claims could be heard in U.S. courts
174
regardless of the petitioners' status as detainees.
B. JusticeKennedy's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy did not take
issue with the Court's endorsement of extraterritorial jurisdiction as
such, but his various points of disagreement with the majority clarify
the Court's actual holding. Although Justice Kennedy endorsed this
extraterritorial application of the statute, he also agreed with Justice
Scalia that the majority had erred in concluding that Braden
overruled the "statutory predicate" to Eisentrager.175 Instead, Justice
Kennedy argued that Eisentrager should be applied in this case, but
that application of Eisentrager would still result in granting these
petitioners writs of habeas corpus. 176 What he preferred to avoid,
however, was an "automatic statutory authority to adjudicate the
'17 7
claims of persons located outside the United States.
Justice Kennedy's approach interpreted Eisentrager as having
established an 'ascending scale of rights' that courts have recognized
for individuals depending on their connection to the United
States.' 78 Moreover, he saw Eisentrageras identifying factors to be
considered in deciding not just whether the courts have jurisdiction,
but also whether the executive should be given free rein in that
"realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial
power may not enter."'179 This provides for a subtle but significant
distinction that focuses on the power of the branches of the
government, not a reading of the habeas statute or even a
determination of territorial jurisdiction, when defining the reach of
the federal courts' powers. This also, however, appears to implicitly
approve of an extraterritorial application of that judicial power

172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 485.
175.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Justice Scalia exposes the weakness in the
Court's conclusion... As he explains, the Court's approach is not a plausible reading of
Braden or Johnson v. Eisentrager.").
176.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177.
Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178.
Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179.
Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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absent certain elements that would place it with in the province of
the executive.
Looking at several factors present in the case of the Eisentrager
prisoners, Justice Kennedy concluded as follows:
Because the prisoners in Eisentrager were proven enemy aliens found
and detained outside the United States, and because the existence of
jurisdiction would have had a clear harmful effect on the Nation's
military affairs, the matter was appropriately left to the Executive
Branch and there was no jurisdiction for the courts to hear the
18 0
prisoners' claims.

He sees the case of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners as
"distinguishable from those in Eisentrager in two critical ways."' 81
One of these is that "the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held
indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceedings to
determine their status.' ' 8 2 A detainment of a few weeks, he asserts,
might "be justified by military necessity" but as time passes, "the case
for continued detention to meet military exigencies becomes
weaker."'1 3 It is arguable that Justice Kennedy has created this
standard out of whole cloth, and it is not at all clear how a reviewing
court is to judge "military necessity" without substantial risk of
crossing into an area that Justice Kennedy has already declared off84
limits to courts.'
Of greater concern for the scope of this Note, though, is Justice
Kennedy's first criterion concerning territoriality. For him,
"Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States
territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities.' 1 5 It is not
clear how he determined that the naval base is a U.S. territory,
although he does cite to the various leases between the United States
and Cuba.' 8 6 This type of reasoning, if it were not merely in a
concurring opinion, could present major problems. It does not provide
any guidance on how other bases, especially those that might be
closer to hostile action, would be evaluated.
Moreover, while the majority seemed to completely abandon the
need for the prisoners to be held in a territory over which a court has
jurisdiction and the dissent would retain that requirement, Justice
Kennedy would make the concept of territorial jurisdiction essentially
nondirective. It is not clear whether an analogous leasehold would
allow for prolonged detention if other factors from Eisentrager are
present. An even more potent question is whether the significance of

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the judicial power may not enter").
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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territoriality
would
disappear
entirely
under
appropriate
circumstances, even theoretically allowing for denial of the writ to a
prisoner detained across the street from the courthouse, provided
there are appropriate military exigencies. Thus, while he may not
have made territoriality a talisman for jurisdiction either way, he
also did not provide anything else that could be clearly understood
and relied upon in the future.
Another ambiguity present in Justice Kennedy's 'concurring
opinion is his source of authority. Indeed, the main authority cited in
18 7
If
his opinion other than U.S.-Cuba leases is Eisentrager.
Eisentrageris read solely as a case interpreting § 2241, then it would
have to follow that Justice Kennedy's logic ultimately rests upon the
statute itself. A close reading of his opinion, though, makes that
conclusion questionable. He did not cite or express reliance upon the
language of the statute. His discussion of Eisentrageris rather one of
balancing elements from that case in the context of balancing the
powers of the executive and the judiciary. This fact leaves open the
possibility that his decision may turn on factors other than the text of
the statute itself. In this way, his logic might be capable of morphing
into something more akin to Judge Prettyman's opinion for the court
of appeals in Eisentrager. It also raises doubts as to how Congress
could use its powers to reshape the statutory writ, if it so desired, to
remove certain classes of enemy detainees from judicial review. As
such, what appears at first to be a more modest approach could
become far more expansive than the majority's opinion, which at least
purported to rest upon the language of the statute itself.
IV. RASUL V. BUSH-THE DISSENTING ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
RATIONALE

A. Justice Scalia's Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued very
passionately that the Court had rendered a "novel holding"
18 8
It
constituting an "an irresponsible overturning of settled law.1
takes great exception to the expansion of jurisdiction and engages in
a thorough analysis of the majority opinion. Because its logic
illustrates the extent of the post-Rasul extraterritoriality, it is
18 9
outlined here.

187.
See id. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188.
Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189.
One section of his dissent-that discussing the impact of the decision on the
conduct of the war on terror-is contained in Part V rather than Part IV of this Note.
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1.

The Court Fails to Give Due Weight to the Text of § 2241 which
Obviously Requires Territorial Jurisdiction over the Petitioner

The Constitution does not require jurisdiction by federal courts
over aliens held beyond U.S. borders, and thus Justice Scalia would
have held that "this case turns on the words of § 2241, a text the
Court today largely ignores."1 90 "Even a cursory reading of the
habeas statute shows that it presupposes a federal district court with
territorial jurisdiction over the detainee," he wrote. 19 ' Unlike the
majority, he read the statute as requiring "some federal district court
[to] have territorial jurisdiction over the detainee. '192 Insofar as the
majority agreed that "the Guantanamo Bay detainees are not located
within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court," his
dissent argued that on that basis19 3alone the Court should have
affirmed the lower courts' dismissal.
2.

Eisentrageris Directly on Point and Should Apply

Justice Scalia noted that Eisentrager was "largely devoted to
rejecting the lower court's constitutional analysis, since the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance underlay its statutory conclusion. '194 The
reasoning in Eisentrager did not greatly concern itself with
construing the statute because "the Court considered it obvious (as
indeed it is) that, unaided by the canon of constitutional avoidance,
the statute did not confer jurisdiction over an alien detained outside
195
Of
the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
to
adherence
strict
prevent
to
Braden
relied
upon
course, the majority
Eisentragerand its result.
3.

The Court Misappropriates Braden

Justice Scalia then asserted that the majority's characterization
of Braden as an overruling of a "statutory predicate" is merely an
"oblique course" around either holding that Braden overruled
Eisentrageror overruling Eisentragerin this present case. 196 The first
the
he said would be laughable and the second would be a violation of 197
Court's "almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases."
Rather than giving Braden the same force that the majority did,
the dissent would have seen that case as standing

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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for the proposition, and only the proposition, that where a petitioner is
in custody in multiple jurisdictions within the United States, he may
seek a writ of habeas corpus in a jurisdiction in which he suffers legal
confinement, though not physical confinement, if his challenge is to
198
that legal confinement.

Such a reading would mean here that "Eisentragerunquestionably
controls."'199 That would have ensured that U.S. federal jurisdiction
remain confined to the territory of the United States.
4.

The Court's Description of the Guantanamo Facility is Baseless

In addressing Guantanamo's legal status, Justice Scalia used the
concept of territoriality to assail the majority's reasoning. First, he
challenged the idea that the United States' "complete jurisdiction and
200
control" brings the base within the scope of U.S. domestic law.
Rather, he noted that the "lease agreements explicitly recognize 'the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over
the [leased areas]'."'201 Justice Scalia further asserted that the Court's
logic would make lands in Iraq and Afghanistan currently held
because of military force subject to U.S. domestic jurisdiction as
20 2
well.
Second, Justice Scalia took on the idea that somehow jurisdiction
over non-citizens held abroad is proper because the government (as
conceded at oral argument) would recognize greater rights for a U.S.
citizen detained at Guantanamo. 20 3 The dissent appears to be quite
correct in countering that this would have "nothing to do with the
special status of Guantanamo Bay" and that the government's
argument here is exactly what the court held in Eisentrager.20 4 It is
therefore quite unclear how this part of the majority's opinion may be
employed in later cases.
5.

The Court Misinterprets the History of the Writ

The dissent concluded by taking issue with a line of British cases
extending into the twentieth century that the majority characterized
as "consistent with" its holding. 20 5 This debate is rather arcane and
beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it to point out that the main
argument urged by the dissenters was that "Guantanamo Bay is not

198.
Id. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
199.
Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200.
Id. at 501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, art. 3, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
202.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203.
Id. at 501-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
205.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a sovereign dominion, and even if it were, jurisdiction would be
20 6
limited to subjects."
6. Conclusion
While some may not see the consequences as being harmful, it is
nevertheless irrefutable that the Court's decision greatly expanded
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts beyond previous bounds. The majority
cited no instances in which this type of extraterritorial jurisdiction
has previously been exercised by federal courts. 20 7 And, the opinion
does indeed appear to have authorized habeas review for all enemy
alien detainees held by the United States anywhere in the world-or
as Justice Scalia put it: "[T]he Court boldly extends the scope of the
habeas statute to the four corners of the earth. '20 8 As has been
shown, there is little in the majority's logic that would work to cabin
it. Moreover, it may even be possible for prisoners to challenge
detention by foreign governments when the person held alleges that
his detention is at the request of the United States; the policy of
"rendition" would be one such example of this. This could even
conceivably create something of a transnational Braden doctrine for
cases in which there is a nexus between the U.S. government and the
foreign state's action. The possibilities at this juncture truly do
appear that boundless.
B. ParallelPaths and the Roads Not Taken
Although not an integral part of the discussion here, it should be
noted that the government was less than wholly successful in two
other terrorism-related cases at the same time it lost in Rasul. In
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court considered the case of a U.S. citizen
who was arrested at Chicago O'Hare International Airport and then
20 9
held by the military in South Carolina under Presidential orders.
The Court, however, declined to reach the merits of the case because
it ruled that the district in which the petition was filed did not have
jurisdiction over Padilla's immediate custodian (Commander Marr);
210
Secretary Rumsfeld was not the proper custodian to have named.
Thus, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority held that
the "District of South Carolina, not the Southern District of New
York, was the district court in which Padilla should have brought his
habeas petition. ' 211 The case was then dismissed without

206.
Id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207.
Cf. id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's treatment of
Guantanamo Bay as "a wrenching departure from precedent").
208.
Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209.
542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004).
210.
211.

Id. at 445-45.
Id. at 451.
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prejudice. 212 In so doing, the Court declined to accept the dissent's
invitation to carve out an exception to the requirement that the
2 13
defendant named in the suit be the immediate custodian.
In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court considered the
petition of a U.S. citizen who was captured while allegedly fighting
for the Taliban in Afghanistan.2 1 4 The U.S. government attempted to
hold him indefinitely. In disposing of the case, the Court produced an
intricate set of arguments and lengthy opinions, which cannot be
addressed meaningfully in the confines of this Note. It should be
acknowledged, though, that the plurality opinion held that, while
2 15
there is no bar to holding a U.S. citizen as an "enemy combatant,"
2 16
there are still due process rights available to the citizen-detainee.
Therefore, the Court concluded that "a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification[] and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
217
neutral decision maker."
More importantly for this discussion, the Court expressly
rejected the "heavily circumscribed role for the courts" that the
Administration had urged. 218 The Court stated that the Government's
"approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of
government. '219 Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined
(interestingly
enough)
by
Justice
Stevens,
rejected
the
Administration's view even more pointedly: "It follows from what I
have said that Hamdi is entitled to a habeas decree requiring his
release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought, or (2)
Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus. '220 Stating that
members of the Court "lack the expertise and capacity to secondguess" the Administration in this area, only Justice Thomas proved
truly amenable to the Government's argument. 22 1 He dissented,
believing the appeal should fail with no remand.
V.

DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO RASUL AND RECOMMENDATION

Returning to Rasul, it is necessary to consider what effects its
holding may have over time for the war on terror. Obviously, many in

212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 449-50.

214.

542 U.S. 507, 509-10 (2004).

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

519.
532-33.
533.
535.
536 (emphasis in original).
573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the legal community were pleased by the Court's ruling, 222 but others
expressed concern over the reach of such an opinion. 223 Because,
224
however, the case seemingly involved only statutory interpretation,
the key issues implicated in the debate remain subject to
congressional control.
A. Dealing with the "Breathtaking"Impact
"The consequence of this holding, as applied to aliens outside the
country, is breathtaking," says the Rasul dissent. 225 This appears to
be quite true when one considers the conclusion, expressed by Justice
Scalia and left unanswered by the majority in its opinion, that the
"Guantanamo Bay detainees can petition in any of the 94 federal
judicial districts," but domestic detainees "must challenge their
'226
present physical confinement in the district of their confinement.
Indeed, the dissenters asserted that the prisoners' extraterritoriality
227
had been transformed into a license to forum shop.
Of course, those are essentially procedural changes. Justice
Scalia also noted that the members of the majority "disregard,
without a word of acknowledgement, the dire warning of a more
circumspect court in Eisentrager.''228 Indeed, the Court did not
discuss the practical effects of its decision, and the habeas actions
made available by Rasul have opened the courthouse doors to any
numbered of legal claims-spurious or otherwise-from the
detainees. 229 As mentioned above, Rasul's unfettering of federal
habeas jurisdiction could conceivably even apply to detainees in a

222.
See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court
Says Courts Can Review Bush Administration Actions in Terrorism Fight (June 28,
2004), http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=16019&c=280
(praising
the rulings as necessary judicial review of the President's wartime actions).
223.
See, e.g., Robert Alt, Terrorists Welcome, Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs
at Ashland University, June 29, 2004, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/alt/04/
rasul.html (criticizing the decision in Rasul as both "bad law" and "bad policy").
224.
At least, the decision was apparently on statutory grounds.
225.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226.
Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227.
Id. But see Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended
July 8, 2004). The Ninth Circuit had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over
Guantanamo Bay even prior to Rasul, but after the issuance of the Supreme Court
opinions in Rasul and Padillait transferred the Gherebi matter to the D.C. Circuit.
228.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229.
Several detainees who had been released by the military's own review after
a determination that it was safe to free them have returned to fight against the United
States in the war on terror. See, e.g., John Mintz, Released Detainees Rejoining the
Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at A01 ("At least 10 detainees released from the
Guantanamo Bay prison after U.S. officials concluded they posed little threat have
been recaptured or killed fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Pakistan and
Afghanistan[.]").
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theater of combat 23 0 and to those held in foreign countries by or at the
231
request of the CIA.
Increased scrutiny has in fact been given to the number of
persons detained throughout the world at the request of the United
States. The New York Times reported at one point that the policy of
rendition, which involves sending prisoners from U.S. custody to
other countries (including, in some cases, the detainee's country of
birth or citizenship) for the purpose of obtaining intelligence,2 3 2 was
responsible for the detention of roughly 100 to 150 terrorist suspects
in foreign countries. 23 3 Other reports have estimated that roughly
83,000 individuals have been in some way detained in places around
the world in recent years, 234 and there has been much attention paid
to the holding of such persons. 235 While the Court may not have
intended to address such individuals, nothing in the logic of the Rasul
opinion obviously prevents it from extending to these persons as well.
Even if these suspects are being held merely at the request of the

230.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asserted that
they did not seek to have the writ made available on the battlefield because habeas has
never been available at common law to those so held. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 15-16, Rasul, 524 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
231.
See Douglas Jehl, Questions Left By C.I.A. Chief On Torture Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al ("In addition, an estimated three dozen people suspected of
being terrorist leaders, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who is suspected of being
the mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, remain in C.I.A. custody in secret sites around
the world."). For an explanation as to how Rasul may be read broadly by those seeking
a way to constrain the manner in which the U.S. handles enemy combatants, see
James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the War on Terror, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 497 (2006). Professor Pfander argues that
Rasul's rejection of the immediate-custodian model of habeas jurisdiction
provides the foundation for a more capacious model of nonstatutory review in
which overseas detention gives rise to an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief . . . [and this] would invite federal courts to recognize that U.S. law
follows the U.S. military into bases and detention centers around the world.
Id. at 539.
232.
Cf. generally Reuel Marc Gerecht, Against Rendition: Why the CIA
Shouldn't Outsource Interrogations to Countries that Torture, WKLY. STANDARD, May
16, 2005, at 21 (arguing against policy of rendition).
233.
Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send
Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1 ("As part of its broad new latitude,
current and former government officials say, the C.I.A. has been authorized to transfer
prisoners to other countries solely for the purpose of detention and interrogation.").
234.
See Katherine Shrader, U.S. Has Detained 83,000 in War on Terror, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2005, ("The United States has detained more than 83,000 foreigners in
the four years of the war on terror, enough to nearly fill the NFL's largest stadium.").
235.
See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons:Debate
Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After
9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01 ("But the revelations of widespread prisoner
abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. military-which operates under published
rules and transparent oversight of Congress-have increased concern among
lawmakers, foreign governments and human rights groups about the opaque CIA
system.").
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United States, there is conceivably a right to judicial review on the
grounds that the detention is being directed by and for the U.S.
government-a party over whom the courts do possess the requisite
jurisdiction. 236 With so great a need for secrecy in the war on terror,
particularly in the collection of intelligence, judicial review of these
detentions
could
prove to be
exceptionally
cumbersome,
23 7
diplomatically problematic, and even gravely dangerous.
Defense Department plans for moving Guantanamo detainees to
other countries suggest that the Administration did not interpret
Rasul to extend to certain overseas detentions. 238 But the removals
themselves encountered judicial obstacles. 239 For instance, on March
12, 2005, a judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia issued an injunction temporarily barring the removal of
thirteen Yemeni nationals from Guantanamo Bay to the territory of
another government. 240 As long as the foreign nation is the one
exercising ultimate authority over the detention, the Government's
apparent interpretation of the opinion might prove to be permissible.
Anything short of that, however, could potentially cause Rasul to
obtain. Rasul could even be seen as creating a sliding scale, with the
Guantanamo detainment sitting at one end and detainment in a
foreign state wholly at the desire of that nation sitting at the other. If
that is the case, the key question may be what level of control the
U.S. exercises in a particular situation. Moreover, if that is the case,
it may also mean that Justice Kennedy's concurrence takes on new
significance.

236.
The Supreme Court might be pushed to take such a position given human
rights concerns or criticism that the Bush administration has been overly reliant on
legal technicalities as a means of insulating detainees from U.S. judicial protections.
See, e.g., Editorial, Torture by Proxy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A22 ("American
officials have offered pretzel logic to defend these practices. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales has said that if the United States sends a prisoner abroad, then our nation's
constitution no longer applies."); cf. Patricia M. Wald, The Supreme Court Goes to War.
in TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY
COMBATANT CASES 37, 41-42 (Peter Berkowitz, ed., 2005) (noting that Rasul was heard
against a backdrop of international criticism towards the U.S. and suggesting that this
prompted the Supreme Court to rule as it did).
237.
Cf. Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President's
War Power Necessarily Remains "The Power to Wage War Successfully," 53 DRAKE L.
REV. 851, 890-91 (2005) (discussing the practical justifications for military tribunals)
("There are multiple reasons [for military tribunals], but these reasons make sense
only in the context of a bona fide war, and especially where the war is being lodged
against a global terror network.").
238.
See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y,
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al ("The proposal is part of a Pentagon effort to cut a
Guantanamo population that stands at about 540 detainees by releasing some outright
and by transferring others for continued detention elsewhere.").
239.
Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4144, at *3 (D.D.C.
Mar. 12, 2005).
240.
Id.
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Some effects need no speculation. In an early habeas ruling,
Judge Joyce Hens Green of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to
rights and privileges under both the U.S. Constitution and the
Geneva Conventions. 24 1 She even found that the prisoners are
entitled to due process rights. 242 Such rulings make clear the extent
to which Rasul has become a viable vehicle for detainees to seek
protections that could quickly become burdens to both the war effort
243
and intelligence operations generally.
Contrasting with that case is an earlier decision by another
district court judge also sitting for the D.C. District. In Kahlid v.
Bush, Judge Richard Leon started with the President's order
empowering the Secretary of Defense to detain certain types of
terrorist suspects; he found this order to be legitimate. 244 His opinion
then noted that "[d]ue to their status as aliens outside sovereign
United States territory with no connection to the United States, it
was well established prior to Rasul that the petitioners possess no
cognizable constitutional rights. '24 5 He thus read Rasul narrowly and
in such a manner as to preserve the force of Eisentrager,stating that
'by focusing on the petitioners' statutory right to file a writ of habeas
corpus, the Rasul majority left intact the holding in Eisentrager and
246
its progeny."
After reviewing various claims by the petitioner-detainees, Judge
Leon found no violation of any specific federal law and concluded,
"The mere fact that the petitioners are in custody, of course, does not
violate any specific federal statutory law because Congress has not,

241.
In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 457, 478-79
(D.D.C. 2005). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting
applicability of Geneva Conventions).
242.
In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464 ("In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, it is clear that Guantanamo Bay must be
considered the equivalent of a U.S. territory in which fundamental constitutional
rights apply. Accordingly ... the Court recognizes the detainees' rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
243.
See, e.g., Andrew McCarthy, A Mixed Bag, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, June 30,
2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy2004O6300915.asp.:
Rasul could, if it unfolds to the full extent of its logic, become a profound blow
to the capacity of the United States to conduct a successful war against a
modern, international terrorist network . . . Empirically, judicial demands on
governmental procedural compliance become steadily more demanding over
time, and government naturally responds by being even more internally
exacting to avoid problems. In no time flat, what was once thought a trifling
inconvenience becomes a major expenditure-in this case one that will
inevitably detract from the military mission which is the bedrock of our safety.
244.
355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
245.
Id. at 321.
246.
Id. at 323.
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to-date, enacted any legislation restricting the President's ability to
capture and detain alien combatants in the manner applicable to
these petitioners." 247 Finding the petitioners' many other arguments
to be unavailing as well, the court granted the Government's motion
to dismiss as a matter of law and stated that any rights of the
detainees are "subject to both the military review process already in
place and the laws Congress has passed defining the appropriate
24 8
scope of military conduct towards" them.
B. CongressionalPower after Rasul
These cases implicate vital national security concerns and
demand a more uniform approach. As such, congressional
examination,
as has recently been undertaken,
is
most
appropriate. 249 And, although this recent legislative action has not

247.
Id. at 324.
248.
Id. at 330. The sharp differences between these two cases illustrate another
genuine problem with the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this area-the diversity of
rulings that may result among the various districts and circuits. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at
506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("license to forum shop"). Obviously, given the extreme
importance of the national security issues involved, such splits among jurisdictions
(and, as shown here, among judges on the same court) are hardly desirable.
249.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art III. § 2 ("In all
other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary
Wills ed., 1982):
If some partial inconveniences should appear to
incorporation of [the powers of the federal judiciary]
be recollected that the national legislature will have
such exceptions and to prescribe such regulations
obviate or remove these inconveniences.

be connected with the
into the plan, it ought to
ample authority to make
as will be calculated to

This is not in any way meant to endorse other proposals that have been made
throughout the years to remove jurisdiction of certain matters from the courts simply
because of substantive policy differences between the judiciary and the political
branches. The central issues implicated in such debates are not even present to the
same extent (if at all) when discussing the rights of those whose rights are not
constitutionally guaranteed. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion about
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
367 (1993):
[A] number of important cases suggest that the right to due process sometimes
entails a right to judicial process and especially to judicial review of
constitutional questions. In other series of cases, however, the Supreme Court
has not only implied that claims to governmental largesse fall within a category
of public rights that permit, but do not require, judicial resolution; the Court
has also enforced immunity doctrines that sometimes preclude effective
remediation for constitutional violations.
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resolved all the procedural and substantive questions left after Rasul,
Congress should be commended for finally doing what many scholars
250
had long been urging it to do.
1. The Graham-Levin Amendment on Guantanamo
Congress's foray into addressing these issues came in November
Taking the lead, Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican
from South Carolina, proposed an amendment to the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006252 that would have
ended attempts of Guantanamo detainees to obtain judicial review in
federal courts. 253 Under the original version of the Graham
Amendment, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would have been the
only court able to hear claims from enemy combatants held in Cuba.
Even then, the court's scope of review would have been very limited.
For instance, in review of a decision to hold a prisoner, the court
2005.251

Cf. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1993) ("The judicial power of the United
States conferred by Article III of the Constitution is upheld just as surely by
withholding judicial relief where Congress has permissibly foreclosed it, as it is by
granting such relief where authorized by the Constitution or by statute."). But, for a
discussion of the importance of the right to habeas review generally see, e.g., Davis v.
Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 298 (6th Cir. 2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("Had not some state
ratification conventions insisted on a Bill of Rights, the federal courts would have had
to create an unwritten Bill of Rights using the writ of habeas corpus and the doctrine
that the elected branches are limited to the enumerate powers named in the
Constitution."). Because action concerning enemy combatants, however, would not
affect the rights of citizens or foreigners present within the borders of the United
States, the real constitutional issue arises in considering whether the removal would
result in a structural imbalance, leaving the judiciary as less than coequal or otherwise
upsetting the separation of powers within the U.S. system of government.
250.
See Carl W. Tobias, Congress Should Act Fast, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 2005,
at 22 ("Should Congress fail to legislate, the executive will likely maintain the status
quo, and this inaction will exacerbate a deteriorating situation."); John Yoo, The
Supreme Court Goes to War, American Enterprise Institute, June 30, 2004,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.20825,filter.all/pub-detail.asp.:
Now is the time for Congress and the president, vested by the Constitution
with all of the war power and directly elected by the American people, to
establish these procedures with a broader view of the costs and benefits for the
war on terrorism. They should not wait for district judges to make these choices
ad hoc simply because they happen to hear the early cases.
251.
See Dan Eggen, Senate Approves Plan to Limit Detainee Access to Courts,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2005, at A07 (reporting on passage of first Graham amendment);
see generally Press Release, Sen. Lindsay Graham, Senate Passes Graham Detainee
Plan: Amendment Sets Guidelines For the Detention of Enemy Combatants and
Clarifies that Foreign Terrorists Do Not Have Unlimited Access to U.S. Courts (Nov.
10, 2006), http:/Igraham.senate.gov/index.cfm?mode=presspage&id=248690 (asserting
that the ultimate goal of the various changes is to "clarif[y] the previous understanding
of the habeas statute that aliens outside the United States do not have access to our
federal courts").
252.
S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005).
253.
Amd. 2516 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005).
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could have asked only "whether the status determination of
the ...Combatant Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien
was consistent with the procedures and standards specified by the
Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals. 2 5 4
Although this amendment was adopted by a vote of forty-nine to
forty-two, 25 5 the Senate soon reversed course as Senator Graham
offered a second amendment in the nature of a substitute and forged
a compromise with his more liberal colleagues, including Michigan's
Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services
Committee. 256 This time by a vote of eighty-four to fourteen, the
Senate voted to relax the restrictions on the scope of review. 257 The
Graham amendment
as modified (now the Graham-Levin
Amendment) also essentially allows for direct review by the D.C.
258
Circuit Court of Appeals of any conviction by a military tribunal.
The senators, however, obviously desired to place some limits on
the current rights of detainees. In between these two votes, an
amendment by New Mexico Democrat Jeff Bingaman that would have
provided for even more elaborate judicial review of enemy combatant
detentions failed by a vote of fifty-four to forty-four. 259 Senator
Graham said that he opposed the Bingaman alternative "because it
preserves habeas rights for noncitizen, foreign terrorists to come into
Federal court at the ...DC Court of Appeals, to put a wide variety of
issues on the table. '260 In essence, Graham believed it would both
hinder intelligence gathering and keep the courts open to virtually
any claim.
Because, however, the Graham-Levin Amendment also permits a
court to consider "whether subjecting an alien enemy combatant to
such standards and procedures ... is consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States," the legislation may not actually prove
as limiting as Senator Graham and others desired. 261 (The same
standard applies to judicial review of any final decision by a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or a military commission. 262) The
phrase sounds innocuous enough, but this Note will later discuss the

254.
Id. at 2516 (d)(2)(C).
255.
151 CONG. REC. S12,667-68 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (Roll Call Vote No. 319
Leg. on Amd. 2516 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005)).
256.
151 CONG. REC. S12,753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (containing text of Amd.
2524 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005) and statement of Sen. Graham).
257.
151 CONG. REC. S12,803-04 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (Roll Call Vote No. 325
Leg. on Amd. 2524 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005)).
258.
Amd. 2524 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005).
259.
151 CONG. REC. S12,800 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (Roll Call Vote No. 324
Leg. on Amd. 2523 to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005)).
260.
151 CONG. REC. S12,756 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham).
261.
Amd. 2524 (d)(2)(C)(ii) to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005).
262.
See id.; id. at (d)(3)(D)(ii) ("whether subjecting an alien enemy combatant to
such order is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States").
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extent to which "Constitution and laws of the United States" is
susceptible to a variety of interpretations, particularly depending
upon how (if at all) treaty obligations and international law are
incorporated into its meaning. 263 Although it may sound alarmist, the
inclusion of this standard could prove to be the exception that
swallows all the other limitations sought by the Amendment. There
are also provisions in the Amendment that raise separation of powers
concerns as between the President and Congress, 264 but those are
minor (at least on this issue at this time) compared to the larger
26 5
question of judicial review for enemy combatants.
Moreover, the Graham-Levin Amendment leaves unanswered
the broader questions surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction after
Rasul.26 6 Indeed, the Amendment appears to apply only to those held

263.
See infra note 307.
264.
See, e.g., Amd. 2524 (a)-(c) to Amd. 2515 to S. 1042, 109th Cong. (2005)
(requiring the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress the procedures used by the
tribunals and mandating certain procedural elements).
265.
For a discussion of presidential war powers that deviates from the more
traditional pro-Congress view see generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 143-83 (2005); cf. J.
Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases-And Their Relevance to Whether "Letters of
Marque and Reprisal" Constrain PresidentialWar Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
465 (2005) (exploring extent to which Supreme Court precedent truly supports
prevailing constitutional opinion that the president may only in engage in a very
narrow type of military engagement without the authorization of Congress). It is also
useful to compare congressional attempts to control prosecution of the war on terror
with attempts by Congress to control aspects of the president's domestic powers. See,
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (striking down provision of the
1993 Brady Act) (holding that, because of Article II's language concerning the
president's duty "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Congress may not
circumvent him by requiring state and local government agents to enforce federal
laws); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-96 (1988) (upholding Independent Counsel
statute because it did not impermissibly undermine or disrupt the executive in
performing duties and functions); id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority's balancing test and arguing that any reduction in the executive's power is
impermissible because the Constitution vests the president with all executive powers).
By logic similar to that used in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Printz, it seems
possible to argue that any congressional action which purports to limit the president's
ability to detain enemy combatants and/or try them with military tribunals might
constitute a violation of the Constitution's separation of powers by diminishing the
"vigor and accountability" present in the execution of the president's powers as
commander in chief. Cf. generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONJAL
FOUNDATIONS, 31-36 (2002) (discussing Justice Scalia's view of executive power as
expressed in Printz and elsewhere).
266.
Although originally offered as an amendment to the Defense Authorization
Bill, the Graham-Levin Amendment first became law as part of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act when that legislation was signed by President Bush on
December 30, 2005. Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006 and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
119 Stat. 2680 (2005); see Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's
Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
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at Guantanamo Bay, which leaves open the possibility of
extraterritorial application of the habeas statute in other
geographical areas. 2 67 And, the effect the Amendment is supposed to
have on cases currently pending in federal courts has become a
matter of great dispute. 268 While the Bush administration contends
that the action by Congress precludes any further review, 269 lawyers

Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
[hereinafter
Bush,
Statement on Defense
Appropriations Bill]. Title X of the appropriations bill was designated as the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, and that same language is likewise found in the 2006 Defense
Authorization Act, which was signed by President Bush on January 6, 2006. National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136;
see also Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's Statement on H.R. 1815,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Jan. 6, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060106-12.html.
The Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 also includes provisions prohibiting inhumane treatment
(Section 1003) as well as a clear (but odd) statement that the new law does not "confer
any constitutional right on an alien detained as an enemy combatant outside the
United States" (Subsection 1005(0). Furthermore, the Act defines the term "United
States" for these purposes so as to expressly exclude Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
(Subsection 1005(g)).
267.
That is to say, the amendment to § 2241 is not a wholesale return to the
interpretation of the habeas statute that prevailed prior to Rasul.
268.
See, e.g., Josh White, Justices May Hear Detainee's Appeal, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2006, at A06 (reporting on Supreme Court's refusal to grant Government's
motion for an immediate dismissal of Hamdan's appeal) (also containing dispute
between Senators Graham and Levin as to the effect of their amendment on pending
cases: "Graham said the courts should decide whether they could continue to hear
previously filed complaints, but Levin said the law was meant to apply only to cases
filed after it was enacted."); Josh White, Levin Protests Move to Dismiss Detainee
Petitions, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2006 at A02 ("Legal experts said yesterday that the
administration may have room to interpret the law because its language is somewhat
vague."); see also Neil A. Lewis, U.S. to Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at All ("The Bush administration notified federal trial judges in
Washington that it would soon ask them to dismiss all lawsuits brought by prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, challenging their detentions, Justice Department officials
said Tuesday.").
269.
See Brief of Respondents in Support of Motion to Dismiss for lack of
Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2006). In signing the
Defense Appropriations Bill, President Bush made clear that he interpreted the act as
applying to pending cases. Bush, Statement on Defense Appropriations Bill, supra note
266:
Finally, given . . . [Congress's decision that] amendments made to section 2241
of title 28, United States Code, shall apply to past, present, and future actions,
including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in that
section. . . the executive branch shall construe section 1005 to preclude the
Federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or
future action, including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in
section 1005.
But see 151 CONG. REC. S12,755 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin)
("[W]e have said that the standards in the amendment will be applied in pending cases,
but the amendment will not strip the courts of jurisdiction over those cases. For
instance, the Supreme Court jurisdiction in Hamdan is not affected."). President
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for the detainees argue that pending cases remained unaffected; this
uncertainty also extends to whether the Supreme Court still retains
jurisdiction over the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (a case on which
the Supreme Court had granted cert just days before the passage of
the Graham-Levin Amendment). Most if not all of these questions,
however, could be addressed by additional legislative action. Thus,
there is still much work to be done so that future controversies
regarding statutory construction over territoriality may be avoided.
2. A Focus on the Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts
The baseline question in any such evaluation of extraterritorial
jurisdiction remains whether Congress possesses the authority to
deny the detainees all judicial review after Rasul. Because the case
was apparently decided on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds, a statutory amendment removing jurisdiction over the
detainees at Guantanamo is thus left completely within Congress's
power. 270 Congress need only restore the "statutory predicate" that
the Court found to no longer exist. This idea might be derided as a
simple act of jurisdiction stripping aimed at achieving a particular
result. But in reality it is not, as so many jurisdiction stripping
proposals are, an attempt to use procedure to change the substantive
law in a manner that Congress could not constitutionally do
otherwise. 271 Amending the habeas statute to prevent its application

Bush's reading better accords with the plain language of the statute. See Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005 (h)(2) ("Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e) shall
apply with respect to any claim whose review is governed by one of such paragraphs
and that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act."). Indeed, a plain
reading would indicate that all pending cases are affected and that, until a final order
is rendered by a military commission, the only action even conceivably available to
detainees at Guantanamo Bay would be one challenging the validity of a "final
decision" (whatever that may be) from a Combatant Status Review Tribunal according
to the scope of review established by the Graham-Levin language. For a discussion of
how broadly that language may be read depending upon the extent to which
international law is incorporated into the standard, see infra Part V.C.2.
270.
The same is also true, of course, of potential action under the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
271.
The ability of Congress to alter the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary (and
particularly of the Supreme Court) was famously, though controversially, addressed in
the 1868 case of Ex parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514-15 (1868). But see
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There
is a serious question whether the McCardle case could command a majority view
today."). There the Court specifically countenanced Congress's removal of jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court, saying that its "power to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of this court is given by express words" in the Constitution. Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. Given that McCardle involved the repeal of jurisdiction after
petitioner McCardle had sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction, the fact that there
has already been substantial legal action by Guantanamo detainees would not seem to
be a barrier to removing jurisdiction. Relying in part on Ex parte McCardle, the
Supreme Court held in 1902 that "a repealing statute which contains no saving clause
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extraterritorially to non-citizens effects a reading of the statute that
the Court had repeatedly approved as constitutionally permissible
and that was only read differently so as to protect the rights due to a
U.S. citizen. 27 2 The Supreme Court did not ground its rationale in
Rasul on the detainees' possession of any constitutional rights-or, if
it did, the Court did not articulate what those rights are. 273 The case
of U.S. citizens, of course, raises constitutional concerns, which is one
reason-among many others-that this class of persons is and ought
to be treated differently; 27 4 aliens within the United States are
similarly situated. Without a claim that any substantive right has
been denied, there is no cognizable necessity for the detainees to
possess a constitutionally enforceable procedural right-unless the
exercise of jurisdiction by the judiciary is necessary to preserve some
structural and systemic requirement that is integral to the U.S.'s
system of government; but that does not appear to be implicated by
an issue such as this. 275 In dealing with war and peace as well as

operates as well upon pending cases as upon those thereafter commenced." Gwinn v.
United States, 184 U.S. 669, 675 (1902). The fact that McCardle had alternative means
to assert his rights even after the passage of the intervening statute in his case would
not appear to impact a law addressing the Guantanamo detainees. For an overview of
the various cases addressing congressional power to restrict the jurisdiction of the
courts as well as the policy implications of such action see generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 3.2-3.3 (4th ed. 2003).

272.
See discussion supra at Part II of cases decided prior to Rasul. This is what
differentiates this proposal from one which seeks to remove the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to hear, for example, Establishment Clause cases. In the latter, Congress is
attempting to use procedure to control what it cannot otherwise alter through ordinary
legislation (i.e., the protections of the First Amendment). By contrast, the Congress has
broad power to extend or deny rights to non-citizens outside U.S. borders.
273.
A footnote in the majority opinion regarding detention in violation of the
laws of the United States tends to support the notion that the Court did believe that
the detainees do possess some substantive rights, but it is unclear what Justice
Stevens meant by this. Rasul, 542
U.S. at 484 n.15 ("Petitioners'
allegations... unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."').
274.
Cf Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481 (noting that the Government concedes "that the
habeas statute would create federal-court jurisdiction over the claims of an American
citizen held at the base").
275.
There is also certainly an argument-and a very powerful argument in that
it implicates the very structural integrity of the federal system-that the judiciary
must play the role of a "referee" as to the allocation of governmental power to protect
either itself or another branch. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
(invalidating "legislative veto") ("The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable
objectives, must be resisted."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-08 (1972)
(holding that an unqualified presidential privilege would unconstitutionally interfere
with the "primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions"); Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677-78 (1929) ("The power thus
conferred upon the President cannot be narrowed or cut down by Congress, nor the
time within which it is to be exercised lessened, directly or indirectly."); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (invalidating a law that encroached upon
presidential power to remove certain officials); City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F.
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matters of foreign policy the judiciary has historically been most
deferential to the political branches. 276 Unless the Supreme Court
recognizes some substantive right conferred upon terrorist detainees
by the laws or Constitution of the .United States, 2 7 7 Congress would
retain the prerogative to bar the exercise of jurisdiction over their

Supp. 168, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (invalidating the "Line Item Veto"), affd, 524 U.S. 417
(1999). Nevertheless, the Court has also not readily discarded standing requirements
nor has it ignored the political question doctrine merely because of an alleged
constitutional violation. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (dismissing
for lack of Article III standing a case brought by members of Congress); Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (dismissing case for lack of standing and for presenting
nonjusticiable political question); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(dismissing for lack of standing suit by member of Congress challenging use of force in
Kosovo), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring):
I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners in this
case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority
of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent
to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President.
The ultimate separation of powers argument to be had on this topic is not easy and
requires far more consideration than can be provided by this Note. But, it can be said
that the president is owed great deference in waging war and managing foreign affairs.
Congressional action supporting the president increases his authority. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). And,
whether any rights are owed to non-citizens not present within the borders of the
United States is highly questionable both in terms of precedent and jurisprudential
theory. Thus, because there is no constitutional question at issue, removing jurisdiction
over claims by non-citizen enemy combatants held abroad is not the same as a case in
which altering the jurisdiction of the courts would result in the Constitution's being
violated with impunity absent judicial intervention. Cf. Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d
695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1987):
[A] statutory provision precluding all judicial review of constitutional issues
removes from the courts an essential judicial function under our implied
constitutional mandate of separation of powers, and deprives an individual of
an independent forum for the adjudication of a claim of constitutional right. We
have little doubt that such a limitation on the jurisdiction of both state and
federal courts to review the constitutionality of federal legislation ... would be
[an] unconstitutional infringement of due process. (internal quotations
omitted).
276.
See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) ("As a government,
the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the
character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern
its relations and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before
limiting or embarrassing such powers."); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 697 (E.D. Pa.
1972) ("[B]ecause any interference by the judiciary might have led to untoward
consequences in our foreign relations, the Supreme Court recognized the necessary
limitations on the exercise of its power to adjudicate certain questions.").
277.
This also includes the "law of nations" or international law, which has been
reaffirmed as part of the domestic law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729
(2004) ("For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations.").
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claims. 278 After all, this was the holding of Eisentrager,a case which
2 79
the majority in Rasul does not wholly overrule or explicitly reject.
The other conceivable problem for post-Rasul congressional
action arises if the Court's decision was driven by a determination
that Guantanamo must, because of its territorial status, receive the
same or similar treatment as territory that is unquestionably part of
the United States (e.g., as if the detainees were being held in a
civilian facility in a U.S. state). Such an interpretation might be
supported by some of the Court's cryptic language, such as that
describing Guantanamo Bay as "a territory over which the United
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control ... [without
possessing] ...ultimate sovereignty." 28 0 As was discussed above, the
Court eventually concluded, however, that the only question
necessary for the determination of Rasul was jurisdiction over the
guardian, and the Court only spoke to any requirement of
territoriality obliquely. 281 In point of fact, the discussion about "the
exercise of control" may have been a subtle attempt to restrict the
precedential force of the opinion. In any event, while this language is
most likely dicta and the legal status of Guantanamo was not likely
changed by Rasul, in certain hands it could always turn out to be the
genesis for a more expansive interpretation of federal jurisdiction in
this area.

278.
Probably the most important concern raised by military detentions is that
they may result in the imprisonment of individuals who are not in fact enemy
combatants. But, the seriousness of this concern does not necessarily mean that the
judiciary should have jurisdiction, and it is far from certain that judicial review would
be any more effective at identifying those who present a true threat.
279.
Some, of course, view Eisentrager as ambiguous and as having been
determined (at least in part) by the petitioners' lack of enforceable substantive rights.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-31, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
280.
Rasul, 524 U.S. at 476. But see id. at 501 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The Court does not explain how "complete jurisdiction and control" without
sovereignty causes an enclave to be part of the United States for purposes of its
domestic laws. Since "jurisdiction and control" obtained through a lease is no
different in effect from "jurisdiction and control" acquired by lawful force of
arms, parts of Afghanistan and Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to
our domestic laws. Indeed, if 'jurisdiction and control' rather than sovereignty
were the test, so should the Landsberg Prison in Germany, where the United
States held the Eisentragerdetainees.
281.

See id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting):

[Tihe Court's opinion, dealing with the status of Guantanamo Bay, is a
puzzlement. The Court might have made an effort . . . to distinguish
Eisentrageron the basis of a difference between the status of Landsberg Prison
in Germany and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. But [it] flatly rejected such an
approach, holding that the place of detention of an alien has no bearing on the
statutory availability of habeas relief, but "is strictly relevant only to the
question of the appropriate forum" . . . Once that has been said, the status of
Guantanamo Bay is entirely irrelevant to the issue here.
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3. The International Law Question
Some forcefully argue that the detainees do possess rights that
are both substantive and enforceable because of international
(like the Geneva
obligations, including treaty obligations
Conventions), owed by the United States.2 8 2 Justice Stevens's
majority in Rasul even asserted in a footnote to the Court's opinion
that the detentions presented violations of U.S. law. 283 Because the
basis for this conclusion is subject to much uncertainty, it is entirely
possible that the Court thereby signaled its concern for the status of
these individuals under treaty law and even international legal
28 4
norms.
The argument that aliens outside U.S. territory lack
constitutional rights finds support in the 2001 case of Zadvydas v.
Davis, in which the Supreme Court held that aliens present in the
United States could not be detained indefinitely simply because there
was no country willing to receive them upon deportation. 28 5 There the
Court reiterated that substantive rights (including due process
286
rights) apply to persons within the territory of the United States.
But, the Court also clearly stated as follows: "It is well established
that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the
United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic

282.
See, e.g., In re GuantanamoDetainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79.
283.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15; cf. also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d
152, 173 n.19 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rasul does little
to clarify the Constitutional status of Guantanamo Bay but may contain some hint that
non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay have some Constitutional protection.") (citing
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 622 (2005).
284.
In the entirely subjective opinion of this Author, however, the Court
probably was not referring to international law or norms or any thing else specifically,
but rather likely rendering a generalized statement of disapproval.
285.
533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001); see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69
("not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the
United States has sovereign power"). The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez cited a number of
instances in which a constitutional protection was held inapplicable in a possession or
territory: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (no constitutional right to jury trial
in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (no constitutional grand
jury protections in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (no
constitutional right to jury trial in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903) (inapplicability of indictment by grand jury and jury trial constitutional
protections in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Revenue Clauses of
Constitution inapplicable to Puerto Rico); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ('The distinction between citizens and aliens follows from the
undoubted proposition that the Constitution does not create, nor do general principles
of law create, any juridical relation between our country and some undefined, limitless
class of noncitizens who are beyond our territory."); cf. id. at 277 ("[W]e must interpret
constitutional protections in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take
actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad[.]").
286.
Id. at 693.
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borders. '28 7 (The Court even cited Eisentrager to support this
conclusion.) Rights are extended only "once an alien enters the
country" because then "the legal circumstance changes, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
'28 8
temporary, or permanent.
The meaning of Zadvydas and other similar cases is that, where
a person is not a U.S. citizen and is not present within the territory of
the United States, any rights owed are due because they have been
extended by Congress rather than mandated by the Constitution.
Thus, just because the Court in Rasul decided that the "statutory
predicate" for the exercise of habeas jurisdiction had been removed by
Braden, this should not foreclose Congress's ability to reinstate that
predicate in the cases of those who have no constitutional right to be
free of it. Accordingly, Congress (theoretically) has the power to deny
the detainees any substantive and procedural rights in U.S. courts. If
the detainees successfully find treaty or international law that
affords them substantive and enforceable rights, this would present a
new set of issues, but even then simple legislation is sufficient to
authorize and enable the President to detain and interrogate persons
free of those constraints. 28 9 Thus, it may be correct as a matter of

287.
Id.
288.
Id. For example, the Court has also previously recognized that no
constitutional or statutory right was implicated when an alien was refused entry to the
United States and no other nation would accept him, which left him as a detainee on
Ellis Island. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953); see United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("Neither the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory
unless in respect of our own citizens.").
289.
But cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In Sosa, the majority
opinion empowered the federal judiciary to enforce certain international law norms
through the recognition of federal causes of action. Nevertheless, it did not alter the
longstanding notion that Congress may derogate international law and treaties in
favor of its own enactments. See LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 209-11 (1996) (explaining the power of Congress to legislate in
contravention of treaty obligations and also noting that treaties and statutes are equal
in force); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ("the last
expression of the sovereign will must control"); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888):

By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the
other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor
to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without
violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the
subject is self-executing.
United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1982):
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legal theory that a president inherently possesses this power by
virtue of his office-viz., to hold enemy combatants outside of the
judicial process because of his status as the executive 29 0-and an
executive certainly must always be cautious about casually
relinquishing powers that are intrinsically associated with Article
11.291 Reality, however, may dictate a different strategy. Even if
executive detention of enemy combatants is authorized by the
president's inherent authority under Article 11,292 the current debate
is focused upon the Authorization for Use of Military Force and other
legislation. 293 As such, the various contours of prior congressional
actions-ranging from the habeas statute to the extent to which
international law is recognized as part of U.S. law-have the
potential to become assorted Trojan Horses for the Bush
administration's position unless their role is clarified and narrowed.
The better part of valor is to seek unambiguous support from

While 'international law' is part of this nation's laws . . . 'international law'
must give way when it conflicts with or is superseded by a federal statute ... to
the extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment ... and
the United States may violate international law principles in order to
effectively carry out this nation's policies.
See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972):

[If Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside
the United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign
relations law, a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional
direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 907 (1987) (describing manner in which to resolve inconsistencies between

international and domestic law). It also bears noting that in Sosa Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas and the late Chief Justice, vigorously disagreed with the manner in
which the majority opinion had extended judicial recognition to international law. See
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737-51.
290.
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("This Court has long recognized these features and has accordingly held
that the President has constitutional authority to protect the national security and
that this authority carries with it broad discretion.").
291.
Cf. generally Hadley Arkes, "The Reasoning Spirit of It:" The President, the
Separationof Powers,and the Laws of Reason, in PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER: THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 89, 89-107 (Robert L. Utley, Jr. ed.,

1989)

(discussing the duty of the president and Congress to interpret the Constitution
independently of the Supreme Court).
292.
Cf. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 ("Not only, as we have
shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character
different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power
is significantly limited.").
293.
For instance, no opinion in Rasul appeared to consider that the habeas
statute should be read in such as a way as to avoid conflict with the president's
intrinsic Article II authority.
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Congress. Of course, if the president is legitimately acting from
Article II power, then congressional backing is, at least legally
speaking, probably superfluous. 294 But with the legal status of
Guantanamo Bay apparently being so enigmatic, 295 the more efficient
course for the Administration would be to obtain clear congressional
support, where practicable, rather than by taking the precarious
approach of relying upon arcane interpretations of Article II which
may be valid but which or may not be sustained when challenged in
court. 296 Ironically, this may prove to be the only ready means to pay
proper deference to the executive's constitutional role as commander
in chief and "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
2' 97
international relations.
C. Applying Rasul: Some Early Guidance and PotentialDangers
Although the Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to
clarify any of these lingering questions, 298 the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed some of them in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 299 The
Supreme Court has since granted Hamdan's petition for a writ of
certiorari, and thus the court of appeals' opinion is subject to
change.3 00 Nevertheless, it is a useful guide for how the
Administration's position may still prevail even post-Rasul.

294.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 907 Reporters' Note 3 (1987) ("There is authority for the view that the

President has the power, when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard
a rule of international law or an agreement of the United States ....")(citing GarciaMir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., FerrerMazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986)).
295.
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-47, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos.
03-334, 03-343) (discussing the type of authority and jurisdiction exercised by the
United States over the territory at Guantanamo Bay).
296.
There are some intriguing proposals for how Congress could construct
schemes that provide judicial review in a manner that is arguably more solicitous to
the position of the would-be detainee. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees
and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The UnderappreciatedVirtues of Deferential
Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 127 (2005).
297.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320 (1936).
298.
For a discussion of the major questions left unanswered by the Supreme
Court, see Benjamin Wittes, Judicial Baby-Splitting, in TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF
WAR, AND THE CONSTITUION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES 101, 103-04

(Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
299.
415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
300.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).
The questions certified by the Court were as follows: (1) "Whether the military
commission established by the President to try [enemy combatants] ... is duly
authorized under Congress's Authorization for the Use of Military Force ...or the
inherent powers of the President?" and (2) "Whether [enemy combatants] ... can
obtain judicial enforcement from an Article III court of rights protected under the 1949
Geneva Convention in an action for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of
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1. Hamdan's Narrow Application of Rasul
In Hamdan, a three-judge panel, including then-judge, nowChief Justice John Roberts, reversed the federal district court below
and approved the government's use of military commissions to try an
accused enemy combatant. 30 1 The defendant, Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
was originally held at Guantanamo Bay after being captured in
Afghanistan, but the government formally charged him following his
filing of a habeas petition. 30 2 A military commission established by
the President was set to try Hamdan, but the action in the D.C.
30 3
District Court delayed the initiation of that process.
Hamdan first claimed that the use of military tribunals is
unconstitutional and violates separation of powers because
"Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the power 'to
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,' that Congress
has not established military commissions, and that the President has
no inherent authority to do so under Article II. ' 304 On appeal, the
court rejected this claim and held that under "the joint resolution and
the two statutes just mentioned [i.e., 10 U.S.C. § 821 and 10 U.S.C.
§ 836], Congress authorized the military commission that will try
Hamdan. ''30 5 The court did not address whether the President would
have had this authority based solely upon his powers as commander
in chief under Article II had there not been congressional
authorization.
With Hamdan, the use of military commissions to try accused
enemy combatants has specifically received judicial imprimatur. The
court's response to Hamdan's next argument, however, provides
guidance for evaluating the scope of international law in this field.
The district court had held that Hamdan should prevail because of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 306 The court of appeals again
disagreed and noted instead that "[i]nternational agreements, even
those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create
private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic
courts." 30 7 As a major part of its analysis, the court in fact looked to

their detention by the Executive branch?"-and on both the Administration's position
had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit.
301.
Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40.
302.
Id. at 35.
303.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). District Judge
James Robertson there held, inter alia, that "unless and until a competent tribunal
determines that Hamdan is not entitled to POW status," Hamdan could only be tried
by a court martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 173.
304.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
305.
Id. at 38.
306.
Id.
307.
Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)). Although classified as part
of the supreme law of the land by the U.S. Constitution, treaties do not automatically
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Eisentrager: "The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jackson,
wrote in an alternative holding that the [1929 Geneva] Convention
was not judicially enforceable: the Convention specifies rights of
prisoners of war, but 'responsibility for observance and enforcement
of these rights is upon political and military authorities."' 30 8 The
court noted that part of Eisentragerwas affected by Rasul, but it then
stated as follows:
This aspect of Eisentrageris still good law and demands our adherence.
Rasul v. Bush ... decided a different and "narrow" question: whether
federal courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 "to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals" at
Guantanamo Bay. The Court's decision in Rasul had nothing to say
about enforcing any Geneva Convention. Its holding that federal courts
had habeas corpus jurisdiction had no effect on Eisentrager's
interpretation of the 1929 Geneva Convention. That interpretation, we
believe, leads to the conclusion that the 1949 Geneva Convention
309
cannot be judicially enforced.

After analyzing the two Conventions and deciding that any
differences between them would not result in the 1949 Convention's
being enforceable, it unequivocally stated that "Rasul did not render

give rise to private rights that are judicially enforceable. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to
the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court."), overruled on other grounds, United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for
enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when the treaty is self-executing[;]
that is, when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action. When
no right is explicitly stated, courts look to the treaty as a whole to determine
whether it evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted); see Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) ('Treaties of the United States rarely bear such a direct relationship to a
private claim that the claim may be said to 'arise under' the treaty as required by
§ 1331.") (citing 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3562 (1984)); see also Goldstar (Panama) v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.
1992) ("Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the document, as a whole,
evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.").
As to the Geneva
Conventions specifically, see Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the
Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126-27 (2004) ("Judicial opinion is
divided on the question of whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing. Two
district courts have expressly held that at least some provisions of the Geneva
Conventions are self-executing. In contrast, the majority of courts that have explicitly
addressed the question have held that the Conventions are not self-executing.").
308.
Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14). The court also noted that it
has relied upon this part of Eisentrager to hold that the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement was not judicially enforceable. Id. (referencing Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d
1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
309.
Hamdan,415 F.3d at 39 (internal citations omitted).
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the Geneva Convention judicially enforceable. That a court has
jurisdiction over a claim does not mean the claim is valid. '310 The
court went on to dispose of Hamdan's other arguments regarding the
effect of the Geneva Conventions (even assuming they were to apply)
and then his argument regarding the effect of domestic laws. 311 The
court concluded that none of these paths was availing.
Although he otherwise fully concurred in the court's decision,
Senior Judge Williams disagreed with Judges Randolph and Roberts
on the applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 312 According to him, "Common Article 3 fills [a] gap,
providing some minimal protection for such non-eligibles in an 'armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties.' The gap being filled is the noneligible party's failure to be a nation. '313 Under this reading, "conflict
not of an international character" is usually understood to mean a
civil war, but it need not be so limited.
[C]ontext compels the view that a conflict between a signatory and a
non-state actor is a conflict "not of an international character." In such
a conflict, the signatory is bound to Common Article 3's modest
requirements of 'humane[]' treatment and 'the judicial guarantees
314
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.'

Notwithstanding that conclusion, however, Judge Williams agreed
that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable.
Hamdan not only makes clear that much of Eisentrageris (or at
least may be) good law; it also firmly holds that the Geneva
Conventions are not judicially enforceable. If this were to become the
uniform view, it would suggest that, in both habeas and other types of
proceedings, enemy combatants are without recourse to treaty law
and probably other customary international norms in determining
whether their detentions are legal. The opinion in Hamdan also
emphasizes that rights derived from international agreements are,
judicially speaking, irrelevant unless those rights have been made
judicially enforceable. Indeed, it even suggests that the courts will not
easily find that a treaty was intended to be self-executing. That would
leave only rights that may exist at generally accepted customary
international law. But even that law may not necessarily grant a
private right of action and, even if it should so grant, Congress
retains the power to prevent its application by enacting its own
315
measures to the contrary.

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
Allen, 760

Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-43.
Id. at 44 (Williams, J., concurring).
Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 371-72 (4th Cir. 1982); see United States v.
F.2d 447, 454 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[Iln enacting statutes, Congress is not bound
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Thus, Hamdan effectuates a swing back towards the views of the
Bush administration. At the same time, it illustrates the twilight
zone that currently exists at this nebulous intersection of federal
jurisdiction, international law, and executive authority to wage war.
There nevertheless remains the chance that a reviewing court will
interpret U.S. laws so as to avoid conflict with "international law or
with an international agreement of the United States, ' 316 and in this
process the Administration's policy may suffer severe hindrances.
Rasul's extension of habeas jurisdiction is in fact what now allows
this wide range of issues to be brought into a court of law; nothing in
the Rasul opinion requires that the legal action now allowed not
result in the release of potentially dangerous individuals; and, Rasul
does not appear to carve out an exception for detentions conducted
solely for the purposes
intelligence
collection. As such,
notwithstanding the fact that the recent Graham-Levin Amendment
has to be seen as a ratification of the Bush administration's policy on
detention and trial of the Guantanamo prisoners, this does not mean
that the expression of congressional desires could not have been
clearer. Indeed, more particularity by Congress would certainly prove
helpful in resolving these lingering ambiguities one way or the other.
2. The Court's Open Door Policy
The 2004 case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain31 7 provides a ready
illustration of the federal judiciary's increased willingness to consider
international law, not just as persuasive authority,3 18 but as

by international law ....
If it chooses to do so, it may legislate [in a manner contrary to
the limits posed by international law].") (citing United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d
248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983), modified on other grounds, 728 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984)); see,
e.g., United States v. Greer, 956 F. Supp. 531, 535 (D. Vt. 1997) ("Although it is clear
that Congress has the power to enact statutes that exceed the limits of international
law, it may not exceed the limits of the due process clause."); cf. Rainey v. United
States, 232 U.S. 310, 316 (1914) ("[I]t is well settled that when a treaty is inconsistent
with a subsequent Act of Congress, the latter will prevail.); The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For
this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
juricial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations[.]").
316.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 114 (1987); see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)
("Ain Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains ......
"); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
Authorization for the Use of Force, InternationalLaw, and the Charming Betsy Canon,
46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 330-31 (2005).
317.
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
318.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005) (discussing
foreign law as justification in part for imposing restrictions on the use of the death
penalty on those whose crimes were committed below the age of 18).
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substantive law to be applied domestically by the federal judiciary.3 19
There the Court held that an alien who had allegedly been abducted
at the direction of the U.S. government was not entitled to remedies
320
under either the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Alien Tort Statute.
In so doing, however, the majority explicitly (via metaphor) left the
door "open to a narrow class of international norms" when
321
determining the applicable law in cases such as this.
As in Rasul, the prevailing rationale put forward by the Court
prompted a vigorous opinion from Justice Scalia, who was joined by
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist in criticizing the
majority opinion. He argued that in the post-Erie world "courts
cannot possibly be thought to have been given, and should not be
thought to possess, federal-common-law-making powers with regard
to the creation of private federal causes of action for violations of
customary international law. '3 2 2 But, his opinion went even further.
According to Justice Scalia, the Constitution's reference to "the law of
nations was understood to refer to the accepted practices of nations in
their dealings with one another (treatment of ambassadors, immunity
of foreign sovereigns from suit, etc.) and with actors on the high seas
hostile to all nations and beyond all their territorial jurisdictions
(pirates). 3 23 Since the majority envisioned a much broader class of
international law that might apply, the possibility for application of
3 24
norms that were unknown to the Founders remains.
Although not at issue in Sosa, there is also the concept of a
peremptory norm or jus cogens, a command of international law from
which no nation can exempt itself.3 2 5 The Restatement (Third)

319.
An example of this may be found in a suit recently filed by a plaintiff
claiming that he was injured as a result of the U.S.'s policy of rendition. The complaint
specifically seeks relief by recourse to international law-including the Geneva
Conventions and other treaties-arguing that "the challenged conduct falls within the
body of acts deemed actionable under the federal common law by the United States
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)." Complaint for
Plaintiff at T 15, El-Masri v. Tenet (E.D. Va.), http://www.aclu.org/images/
extraordinaryrenditionassetupload-file829_.22211.pdf. The same complaint also seeks
to place the plaintiffs claim under the Alien Tort Statute because, under Sosa, the Act
"recognizes as federal common law those international norms that have definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations." Id. at 14.
320.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
321.
Id. at 729.
322.
Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).
323.
Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring).
324.
Justice Scalia was very clear about his views: "American law-the law
made by the people's democratically elected representatives-does not recognize a
category of activity that is so universally disapproved by other nations that it is
automatically unlawful here, and automatically gives rise to a private action for money
damages in federal court." Id. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
325.
If accepted on its own terms, this principle would seem to say that Congress
may not have the ability to legislate in contravention of such peremptory norms, but
such an extra-constitutional limitation on Congress's power to legislate is exceptionally
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includes "prolonged arbitrary detention" among prohibitions covered
by this phrase, 326 which may or may not be understood to include the
detentions at Guantanamo Bay. On the one hand, the whole notion of
a "peremptory norm" does not readily accord with the United States'
usual manner of recognizing international standards.3 27 But on the
other hand, given the increasing tendency of the federal judiciary to
be more amenable to such claims, 3 28 those who would prefer to have
the judiciary play a circumscribed role in the war on terror may be
resting on a slender reed that will snap sooner or later as the
implications of language like that found in Sosa emerge. Even those
on the other side, who welcome the coming of broader judicial review
that incorporates international legal principles, must be wary of the
judiciary's assumption of these powers without recourse to a more
coherent and predictable set of principles.
Thus, there are two concomitant trends that may be discerned
within the federal judiciary: (1) a growing extraterritoriality of
domestic courts' jurisdiction and (2) an increasing willingness by
those same courts to recognize international norms. Cases like Rasul
may adumbrate a new era of ambiguous, ad hoc judicial activity in
the area of foreign affairs unless Congress takes seriously the task of
defining what role it wishes the judiciary to play and to what extent it
desires to make legal protections available in civil actions by enemy
combatants. If the judiciary does not agree that certain powers
inherently belong to the president because of his role as the
commander in chief, then the backing of Congress becomes all the

dubious. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933) ("As a nation with all the
attributes of sovereignty, the United States is vested with all the powers of government
necessary to maintain an effective control of international relations."); cf. Reid v.
Covert, 341 U.S. 1, 74 (Harlan, J., concurring):
[T]here is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition precedent to
exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it subject to all the
guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and
considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee
altogether impracticable and anomalous.
326.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).

327.

See Ruth Wedgwood, The Supreme Court and the Guantanamo Controversy,

in TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY
COMBATANT CASES 159, 177-81 (Peter Berkowitz, ed., 2005) (calling the notion of a

peremptory norm "controversial" and discussing the role of practical experience for
judging humanitarian conditions).
328.
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750-51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring):
It would be bad enough if there were some assurance that future conversions of
perceived international norms into American law would be approved by this
Court itself ... [b]ut in this illegitimate lawmaking endeavor, the lower federal
courts will be the principal actors; we review but a tiny fraction of their
decisions. And no one thinks that all of them are eminently reasonable.
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more important lest U.S. law be left in a state of jurisdictional
schizophrenia. The stakes of the war on terror are too high for
Congress to engage in the kind of passivity and acquiescence that is
common
in
the
general
process of
ordinary statutory
329
interpretation.
3.

Recommendation: Consider the Entire Context when Deciding
Hamdan

Assuming that the Supreme Court does not dismiss Hamdan as
a result of the Graham-Levin Amendment, the Court will face the
difficult task of deciding two questions. The first asks whether the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the inherent
powers of the presidency authorize the trial of detainees by military
commissions. The second inquires into the availability of relief
predicated upon the Geneva Conventions. The appellate court below,
of course, had decided that the detentions and trials were perfectly
legal.
Given the actions of the Congress in late 2005, both of these
questions
would appear
to implicate
classic
Youngstown
considerations. 330 For, even if the 2001 AUMF and the inherent
powers of the executive do not give the Bush administration the
power to try enemy combatants, the recent legislation presumes that
there is some legitimate authority currently existing in the
presidency to try these individuals. At the very least this has to
represent some implicit authorization by Congress for the use of
military tribunals. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that
presidential power here, in Justice Jackson's words, "is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. '33 1 For a court to hold under these
circumstances that the President lacks this authority would be to
insist upon levels of legislative precision that would have to be
332
considered surprising--especially given the foreign policy context.

329.
See generally KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 226-27 (2002) (describing the process of statutory
interpretation as a "conversation between Congress and the courts").
330.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
331.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate."); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (refusing to
invalidate presidential action undertaken with congressional acquiescence since the
action had "been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute").
332.
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322 ("When the President is to be
authorized by legislation to act in respect of a matter intended to affect a situation in
foreign territory, the legislator properly bears in mind the important consideration that
the form of the President's action . . . This consideration, in connection with what we
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The second question is more difficult, in part for the reasons
encountered above in the discussion of how broadly the term
"Constitution and laws of United States" as used in the GrahamLevin Amendment might be interpreted by a court. The GrahamLevin Amendment embodies congressional will, which is expressed
both explicitly and implicitly: explicitly it establishes certain
procedures, but implicitly it approves of certain powers being
exercised by the Administration. Thus, in any claim that the
Administration's actions potentially conflict with a prior expression of
law by Congress as derived from treaty and international law, the
Court would have to consider carefully the argument that the
Graham-Levin Amendment has ratified President Bush's policies and
thereby made this ratification the undisputed latter expression of the
sovereign will-an expression which must be controlling. 333 Indeed, to
read the Graham-Levin Amendment as not necessarily approving of
the Administration's policy on detentions risks leaving a maddening
circularity-to wit, that the Congress has authorized detentions only
insofar as detentions are legal, but they are legal only insofar as
Congress has authorized them. Notwithstanding such a common
sense and pragmatic understanding of the recent action, it would not
be at all surprising if a federal court were to conclude that phrase
"Constitution and laws of the United States" is so ambiguous that the
court itself is empowered to decide whether the detainees possess
privately enforceable rights as a result of non-statutory, nonconstitutional sources. And, this is why Congress likely needs to
clarify this language.
Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately approves of the
reasoning of the court below in Hamdan regarding the judicial
enforceability of the Conventions, pragmatic and prudential concerns
can provide a guide as to how it should proceed. The mere absence of
a detainee's right to bring a civil claim in federal court does not
necessarily mean that the detainee is left wholly without protections.
The Bush administration itself has promulgated standards to be used
in the treatment of such personnel, and moreover certain violations of
the law are already subject to criminal sanction, including the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 3 34 Indeed, there have been many
such prosecutions and other disciplinary actions. 335 While it is not a

have already said on the subject, discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this
field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the
President is to be governed.") (emphasis added).
333.
See sources cited supra note 289.
334.
10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.; see also id. § 802 (persons subject to UCMJ
provisions); id. § 805 (extraterritorial application of UCMJ).
335.
See, e.g., Donna Miles, Rumsfeld: Military Always Has Banned Detainee
Abuse, Am. Forces Press Service, Dec. 16, 2006 (reporting that "DoD has conducted 12
major reviews, reports and investigations, multiple internal reviews and more than 600
investigations" into allegations of detainee mistreatment and "more than 200 soldiers,
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perfect means by which to prevent torture, abuse, and neglect,
allowing the executive to police itself enables it to differentiate
between genuine claims and those that are spurious. It also pays
greater heed to the executive's constitutional primacy in the area of
foreign relations. Thus, the most meaningful efforts to secure
humanitarian protections are those criminal prosecutions brought by
the U.S. government against individual offenders; such is vastly
preferable to expanding the rights of a detainee to obtain civil relief
and redress in an Article III court. This will not satisfy those who
contend that the Guantanamo detentions are ipso facto illegitimate,
but nothing demands that these critics be satisfied, especially if their
interpretation of current legal principles is erroneous.
VI. CONCLUSION

Regardless of one's view on the current detainment policy and
the scope of judicial jurisdiction, it seems inescapable that Rasul
significantly changed the landscape for the war on terror. Thorough
congressional review would at least allow a chance for further
investigation into just how the detainee cases affect the war on terror
over time. The review that has thus far officially occurred in
Congress-the debate and votes relating to the Graham, Bingaman,
and Graham-Levin amendments-was undertaken hastily in the
midst of debate on the 2006 defense authorization bill and did not
allow for much deliberation. Ultimately, it must be concluded that the
Supreme Court's decision in Rasul leaves too much uncertainty,
which suggests that congressional narrowing of judicial review by the
courts was and remains a wise course of action. Indeed, this may be
the only effective means by which to "bring terrorists to justice" as
was pledged by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair so soon
after 9/11.
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